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Abstract
This project report is a component of the culminating project required by the California
Polytechnic State University, Master of Science, Fire Protection Engineering program. The
purpose is to demonstrate the student’s comprehensive knowledge, skill, and ability to
evaluate fire and life safety engineering principles utilizing both prescriptive and performancebased design as applied to the built environment. The student project building is a two-story,
78-bed, federally funded, government owned, skilled nursing facility with 90% of the
occupants being mobility impaired.
The project building was designed and constructed using prescriptive codes. Fire and life
safety structural components, means of egress, fire alarm system, suppression systems, and
smoke control systems were evaluated. The analysis revealed three conflicting fire protection
elements to the prescriptive codes. The first being the new building roof deck was not
constructed using a 1-hour fire resistance rated material; the second being the window
openings in the rated exterior walls between the new and existing buildings (East and West
sides) exceeded allowable area limits for unprotected openings in a rated exterior wall; the
third being the magnetic door hold open devices were not provided in the fire alarm system
sequence of operations matrix.

The roof deficiency resulted in the brand-new building sitting vacant for several months until
an equal or greater level of protection was agreed upon, installed, and passed final inspection.
In the available construction drawings analyzed, the percentage of allowable area for
unprotected openings permitted in an exterior wall based on separation distance was
contradictive to prescriptive code requirements. As-built suppression system drawings
revealed there were no water curtains installed to protect any exterior wall openings in the
new building. The unprotected openings were not field verified that standard windows were
installed as plans specified. The fire alarm system sequence of operations matrix update to
include the magnetic hold-open devices is inconsequential in comparison to the other two
structural fire protection elements noted.

The performance-based analysis included rescue procedures of staff, occupant
characteristics, flammability assessment, tenability, and a zone-model design fire simulation.
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the goal sought after is preserving life safety and to provide insight to increase the survivability
of mobility impaired occupants during a fire. The objectives being pursued to accomplish this
the goal were to evaluate rescue and evacuation practices of the staff evacuating mobility
impaired occupants and the effectiveness of fire and smoke containment measures
integrated into the building.
The design fire scenario was simulated to be on a 2nd-floor resident room, near an egress
stairwell. Resident bed capacity of the chosen smoke compartment is 20 residents. The size
of the chosen smoke compartment is 11,390 ft2. The design fire ignition source chosen was
a faulty wall TV. The wall TV was impregnated with fire retardant resulting in slow burning to
start. The peak heat release rate of the wall TV was 5 kW at 420 seconds. At 150 seconds,
the wall TV pooled on top of the combustible pine wood dresser below the wall TV, which
subsequently ignites the wood dresser. The peak heat release rate of the wood dresser was
1,800 kW at 420 seconds. No additional fuel sources contributed to fuel load in the project
design fire. Calculated estimates of the HRR needed to cause flashover ranged between
1,151 kW and 2,630 kW. Flashover was not evidenced in the design fire simulation. Room
#2 maximum upper layer temperature observed during the FDS simulation was 854 °C at 423
seconds.
20 total occupants are assumed to be in the smoke compartment during the simulated design
fire. Two of the total occupants were staff, the remainder were resident occupants. The facility
reported 90% of the occupants required staff assistance to aid in evacuation. The occupants
requiring staff assistance were assumed to be in their room, alert, dressed, and in their
wheelchairs ready and waiting for evacuation assistance from staff.
The second-floor smoke compartment containing the design fire has a total of two exits. The
West exit door is approximately 11-feet Southwest of room #2 and was assumed not utilized
as a means of egress, considered impassable due to the fire location. The second exit is
located on the East side of the smoke compartment and passage provides a safe place for
occupants.

The Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) is the time to critical conditions. For this project, the
Fractional Effective Dose (FED) and visibility obscuration at the East Exit were two criteria of
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critical conditions selected. A FED value of 0.5 for incapacitation criteria and a FED value of
1.0 for lethality criteria was recognized. A visibility obscuration of 2 meters (6.6 feet) above
the floor was selected due to staff familiarity of the facility. The FDS design fire simulation
revealed a maximum FED value of 0.04 and a maximum visibility obscuration of 2.06 meter
(6.8 feet) above the floor at the East exit at 1000 seconds (16.7 minutes), the conclusion of
the simulation. Room #2 tenable conditions deteriorated quickly, resulting in FED value
greater than 0.5 suggesting the resident had met FED incapacitated criteria upon arrival of
rescue staff.
The Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) is the time it takes to evacuate to a safe place.
Calculations revealed 677.4 seconds (11.3 minutes) was necessary to evacuate the
occupants through the East exit of the affected smoke compartment into the adjoining smoke
compartment designated as the safe place.
The results of the performance-based design fire simulation in comparison with the tenability
criteria revealed the RSET was greater than ASET in room #2 implying the occupants would
not make it to the safe place unaffected by fire conditions. Several assumptions were made
in this design fire, such as the sprinkler system being down for maintenance and nonfunctional, only two staff members performed the entire smoke compartment evacuation and
were unaffected by the products of combustion, the West exit was not used; room #2 door
was left open after rescue; or the 5 kW HRR of the ignition source did not activate the fire
alarm prior to the wood dresser fire. These and other assumptions made may or may not be
pertinent during a real fire event and would certainly impact safe egress times for the better
or worse.
Recommendations based on the design fire simulation supported the significance of
frequently inspecting, testing, and maintaining the detection, suppression, and containment
systems to ensure operational readiness, and where deficiencies exist, provide prompt
corrective action. The simulation supported isolating a fire to the room of origin whenever
possible, being essential to slow the spread of products of combustion. Lastly, the simulation
supported tenable conditions can change rapidly and is essential to have additional rescue
staff available to respond promptly to assist in the timely evacuation of occupants.
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Prescriptive-Based Design Analysis
Introduction
Prescriptive based design is a cookie cutter approach to achieving a minimum level of
safety and is often the approach of most construction projects, to include this one. The
subsequent segment illustrates the applicable prescriptive model codes for the project
building selected for this assignment.
The building is a government-owned, skilled nursing facility located in the United States.
Due to litigation, the facility information is omitted from this report.

The facility has over one hundred staff providing long-term care, skilled nursing care, and
rehabilitative therapy services to include 24 Hour skilled nursing supervision and care;
direct personal care; therapeutic & diversional activities; physical therapy; occupational
therapy; speech therapy; restorative nursing; specialized wound care nurse; monthly care
plan reviews; x-ray & laboratory services; consultations regarding vision, hearing, dental,
podiatry & mental health; a beauty and barber shop; therapeutic dietary services;
newspaper & mail delivery; daily laundry service; private & semi-private rooms;
televisions with cable in every resident room; telephones in every resident room;
resident/facility lounges; and a full time licensed social worker.

All the residents are over the age of 65. The facility manager reported 90-percent of the
residents were mobility impaired and would require staff assistance during an emergency.
This study will evaluate applicable prescriptive-based fire and life safety features, as
well as provide a theoretical performance-based fire design and egress evacuation
scenario using computer simulated zone-type modeling program. The performancebased study will simulate a second story resident room fire near a primary means of
egress and calculate a time for evacuation of the occupants.
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The subject building chosen for this study is a newly constructed, two story, 54,840
square feet, 78-bed Long Term Care (LTC) facility, replacing an existing 23,180
square foot building. The two buildings are connected. Upon occupancy approval of
the new building, the existing building will be repurposed for office use, food
preparation, and therapy for the residents. The existing building is not being
evaluated in this study. For egress purposes, evacuation to the existing building is
being considered equivalent to ground floor evacuation to the outside.

Building Orientation
The following figures are provided to visualize the building being studied for this project.
Figure 1 shows the 2nd-floor layout of the building. Figure 2 shows the 1st-floor layout of
the building. Figure 3 reflects the location of the smoke compartments on the 2nd-floor.
Figure 4 reflects the location of the smoke compartments on the 1st-floor. Figure 5 is of
the northside (front) of the building and Figure 6 is of the southside (back) of the new
building and the northside of the existing building.

FIGURE 1 - 2ND STORY FLOOR PLAN
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FIGURE 2 - 1ST STORY FLOOR PLAN.

FIGURE 3 - 2ND STORY SMOKE COMPARTMENTS.
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FIGURE 4 - 1ST STORY SMOKE COMPARTMENTS.

FIGURE 5 - NORTHSIDE, EXTERIOR FRONT VIEW.
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FIGURE 6 - SOUTHSIDE, EXTERIOR BACK VIEW.

Codes, Laws, and Standards
The State of Michigan by legislative law, employs the International Construction Codes (ICC), as
amended, excluding the state’s fire code. The building code referenced throughout this document
and used interchangeably to mean one in the same, is the International Building Code (IBC) or
Michigan Building Code (MBC). The State of Michigan Fire Code by legislative law, employs the
NFPA 101 Life Safety Code of various versions depending upon type of state licensed facility.
Specific to this facility at the time of design, the 2006 edition NFPA 101 Life Safety Code was
applicable. The design firm chose to utilize the 2009 edition NFPA 101 Life Safety Code. Due to
construction issues discussed herein, the 2012 edition NPFA 101 was applicable at the conclusion
of the build.
The U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) required the 2000 edition NFPA 101
Life Safety Code and is specified in the federal certification requirements as stated in part
483 of the Code of Federal Regulations for facilities wishing to participate in that program.
This facility participates in CMS federal certification for funding. During the construction of
the facility, the federal government adopted the 2012 edition NFPA 101 Life Safety Code.
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Other applicable codes for this project include Accessible and Usable Buildings and Facilities - ICC
/ ANSI A117.1-2009, the Federal Register’s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and local codes,
standards, and ordinances as applicable. Lastly, Michigan healthcare facilities are also governed
under licensing rules promulgated via the authority of section 217 of the P.A. 368 (the
Michigan Public Health Code) which mandate prescriptions from the 2007 Minimum
Design Standards for Healthcare Facilities in Michigan.

Construction Classification
IBC section 602.1 specifies the requirement of a buildings construction classification type
as defined in sections 602.2 through 602.5, including the fire resistance rating
requirements be not less than specified in IBC Table 601 and Table 602, and section
703.2. As a federal funded facility, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
requires the facility to also comply with NFPA 101 Life Safety Code.
At the time of construction, the 2006 edition NFPA 101 Chapter 18, section 18.1.6
identified the minimum construction requirements permitted. Without permission allowed
elsewhere in NFPA 101, only Type I and Type II construction was permitted for a 2-story
healthcare building or structure; Type II (111) is the minimum. This corresponds with Type
II-A minimum construction in the IBC. The building owner elected to design and build this
facility as IBC Type II-A / NFPA Type II (111) construction classification.

Occupancy and Use Classification
The occupancy classification is considered by the IBC section 308.1 as an Institutional
Group I, as the use of this building or structure, or a portion thereof, in which care or
supervision is provided to persons who are or are not capable of self-preservation without
physical assistance or in which persons are detained for penal or correctional purposes
or in which the liberty of the occupants is restricted.
2009 IBC section 308.3 Institutional Group I-2 is described as buildings and structures
used for medical care on a 24-hour basis for more than five persons who are incapable
of self-preservation. This facility fits in this description.
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2012 NFPA 101 section 3.3.140.2 defines a nursing home as a building or portion of a
building used on a 24-hour basis for the housing and nursing care of four or more persons
who, because of mental or physical incapacity, might be unable to provide for their own
needs and safety without the assistance of another person, also applicable to this build.

Conclusion
Applicable edition of building construction and fire safety prescriptive codes are made law
by each Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) governing the building through a legal
adoption process. The newest edition from all AHJ’s involved is often used as the base
minimum design standard. Summarized in Figure 7 and Figure 8, the design code
summary sheets extracted from the construction drawings provided by the facility, show
2009 Michigan Building Code and 2007 International Fire Code were specified. 2006
edition NFPA 101 Life Safety Code was state law at the time of design. Federal Law
required the 2000 edition NFPA 101 be met during planning and design.
Starting with the building code, the intended use and occupancy intentions of the building
are determined. The IBC Chapter 3 entitled Use and Occupancy Classification defines
this type of building as an I-2. From here, all other applicable or referenced prescriptive
codes are based off the classification of I-2. NFPA 101 section 4.4.2.1 describes
prescriptive-based fire protection as a prescriptive-based life safety design shall be in
accordance with Chapters 1 through 4, Chapters 6 through 11, Chapter 43, and the
applicable occupancy chapter, Chapters 12 through 42. Chapter 18 entitled New
Healthcare Occupancies was the applicable chapter for the building design.
A prescriptive-based life safety design is the traditional norm. Each applicable
requirement is met individually, and the resultant level of life safety is deemed to meet the
goals and objectives of sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. The requirements are chosen,
depending on occupancy classification, from a wide host of possible Code chapters,
except Chapter 5, Performance-Based Option.
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Structural Analysis
Introduction
The IBC construction type is 2-A, Protected Non-Combustible. The use group is an
I-2 (Institutional). The NFPA 101 construction type is Type II (111). The first number
in parentheses, a 1, denotes the minimum fire resistance rating, in hours, of any loadbearing exterior walls; the second number, a 1, provides the minimum rating of the
structural frame, including girders and columns supporting loads for more than one floor;
and the third number, a 1, specifies the minimum rating of floor-ceiling assemblies.
The building design summary sheets shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 reflect MBC
Table 503 requirements which prescribe a maximum height of two stories with a floor
area of 15,000 ft2 per story for a Type 2-A constructed building. A suppression system
allowance increases the height maximum by 20 feet or one story. The maximum area
allowance with sprinkler protection is 200 percent per story above grade. Frontage
on a public way or open space of at least 20 feet in width can increase area allowance
as well by using IBC equation 5-2. In total, this building is allowed an area of 55,260
ft2 per floor and maximum of three stories above grade. The constructed building has
two stories and is 54,840 ft 2 . The height of the building from the 1st-floor finished
concrete slab vertically 12’8” makes up the 1st-floor. The top of the 2nd-floor from the
first floor finished concrete slab is 21’-9”. From the peak of the roof to the 1st-floor
finished slab is 36’-1”.
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FIGURE 7 - INITIAL DESIGN CODE INFORMATION SHEET A-1.2.
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FIGURE 8 - INITIAL DESIGN CODE INFORMATION SHEET A-1.3.
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The building under construction, shown in Figure 9, the building is of primary steel frame
construction resting on concrete footings under a 4-inch poured concrete floor. The exterior
walls will include concrete block, metal studs, gypsum board, and finished with a modular
brick veneer to provide a one-hour fire resistance rating.
The roof assembly uses metal trusses, plywood decking, and asphalt shingles. The building
is separated from the existing structure by a 2-hour fire wall and includes several one-hour
rated fire walls within. The building has an automatic sprinkler system with quick response
sprinkler heads throughout and employs a complete, total coverage fire alarm system.

Foundation
The structural assembly of the building begins at ground level with reinforced concrete footings
beneath each column location and is covered with a reinforced concrete slab of 4 inches thick.
The stairwell’s have a thickened slab under the concrete masonry unit (CMU).

Figure 9 - IBC Type 2A, Group I-2, NFPA Type II (111) Building Under Construction.
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Exterior Walls
Exterior walls employ steel wide-flange columns support steel wide-flange girders, beams, and
joists. All structural steel has sprayed-on fire-resistant material (SFRM) to achieve the 1-hour
fire resistive rating as specified in IBC Table 601.

The exterior walls are non-load bearing, mostly constructed of steel studs spaced 16" on
center with insulation in the stud space, 5/8" gypsum board on the interior face, 5/8"
gypsum board exterior sheathing, and a brick veneer to provide the 1-hour rating. Exterior
doors and windows are not rated. This includes the windows on the south side, between
the old and new buildings as shown in Figure 10. IBC section 705.8 states openings in
exterior walls shall comply with sections 705.8.1 through 705.8.6. IBC section 705.8.1 allowable
area of openings states the maximum area of unprotected and protected openings permitted in
an exterior wall in any story of a building shall not exceed the percentages specified in IBC Table
705.8 (shown as Figure 11); the listed exceptions do not apply to this building.

Further, IBC section 705.8.2 protected openings states where openings are required to be
protected, fire doors and fire shutters shall comply with IBC section 715.4 and fire window
assemblies shall comply with IBC section 715.5.

Exception: opening protectives are not required where the building is equipped
throughout with an automatic sprinkler system in accordance with IBC section 903.3.1.1
and the exterior openings are protected by a water curtain using automatic sprinklers
approved for that use.

Both buildings are fully sprinklered, however, the as-built sprinkler system drawings revealed no
sprinkler water curtains were provided to any exterior openings of this project, including the
openings between the new and existing building (shown in Figure 10 with red arrow). Required
by IBC Table 705.8 as shown in Figure 11. Field inspection would be necessary to obtain asbuilt measurements and window rating data to further validate this design drawing observation.
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FIGURE 10 - UNPROTECTED OPENINGS BETWEEN BUILDINGS.
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FIGURE 11 - IBC TABLE 705.8.
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Floor and Roof Assembly
The 1st-floor assembly is constructed of 4” reinforced concrete slab. The 2 nd-story floor is
constructed on top of steel columns with 20 gauge galvanized composite steel metal deck with
3-1/2" of regular weight concrete with 6x6-W1.4xW1.4 welded wire fabric (WWF) reinforcement
placed at 1” from top.

The roof assembly is constructed on top of steel columns with 20-gauge rib metal deck under
the pre-engineered metal trusses. Standard 1/2” Oriented Strand Board (OSB) decking on top
of the metal trusses and gable ends was installed, followed by an underlayment and asphalt
shingles.

NFPA 101, 18.1.6.3 states any building of Type I (442), Type I (332), Type II (222), or Type II
(111) construction shall be permitted to include roofing systems involving combustible supports,
decking, or roofing, provided that all of the following criteria are met:

(1) The roof covering shall meet Class A requirements in accordance with ASTM E 108,
Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Roof Coverings, or ANSI/UL 790, Test Methods
for Fire Tests of Roof Coverings.

(2) The roof/ceiling assembly shall be constructed with fire retardant-treated wood
meeting the requirements of NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction.

(3) The roof/ceiling assembly shall have the required fire resistance rating for the type of
construction.”

As prescribed by NFPA 101, 18.1.6.3 (#2 & #3), the roof deck installation of standard OSB did
not meet the criteria for roof/ ceiling assemblies. Over 1,100 sheets of non-fire treated OSB were
installed. In-lieu-of the standard OSB removal and replacement with chemically treated fire
retardant OSB to meet the NFPA 101 prescription and likely causing damage and replacement
of many metal trusses, alternate protection methods and systems were proposed to the AHJ’s.
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The proposed and installed solutions approved by the State Fire Marshal’s Office ahead of
CMS’s disapproval, were a full coverage quick response attic dry pipe suppression system and
spray applied Forcefield, Fireguard E-84 Intumescent Paint for Gypsum/Wood/OSB to the entire
underside (attic) of the roof deck where the untreated OSB was exposed in the attic.
CMS returned the verdict that the intumescent paint would not meet or exceed the intent of NFPA
220 (by NFPA 101 reference) section 4.3.1 and the roof being of approved noncombustible or
limited-combustible materials. Further, NFPA 220 section 4.1.6 through section 4.1.6.5
prescribes requirements to meet limited-combustible materials. section 4.1.6.4 in particular
required the following: the material shall be composed of materials that, in the form and thickness
used, neither exhibit a flame spread index greater than 25 nor evidence of continued progressive
combustion when tested in accordance with ASTM E 84, Standard Test Method for Surface
Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, or ANSI/UL 723, Standard for Test for Surface
Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, and are of such composition that all surfaces that
would be exposed by cutting through the material on any plane would neither exhibit a flame
spread index greater than 25 nor exhibit evidence of continued progressive combustion when
tested in accordance with ASTM E 84 or ANSI/UL 723.
The untreated OSB exhibited a flame spread rating of 76-200 and a smoke-development index
of <450 per the installing contractor. The performance data of the intumescent paint indicated a
flame spread of zero and a smoke index of 5. However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph
from NFPA 220 section 4.1.6.4, all surfaces that would be exposed by cutting through the
material on any plane would not be met from intumescent paint being applied to the attic side of
the OSB. CMS requested a total (complete) fire alarm system be installed throughout the facility
to be eligible for participation in federal funding.

Interior Non-Load Bearing Walls, Partitions, and Ceilings
Interior non-load bearing walls and partitions are constructed of 3-1/2" steel studs spaced 16"
on center with the cavity filled with insulation and enclosed with 5/8" Type-X gypsum board on
the surfaces. The height of the interior walls ranges from eight feet in resident rooms to ten feet
in the open areas. The ceiling of each floor is mostly Class-A, drop in tile except in designated
hazardous rooms where 5/8" Type-X gypsum board is installed.
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Structural Fire Resistance
IBC section 602.2 Types I and II construction specifies building elements listed in IBC Table 601
shown as Figure 12, be of noncombustible materials, except as permitted in IBC section 603
(exterior wall finishes, insulation, interior wall and floor finishes, millwork, trim, etc.) and
elsewhere as specified in the code. IBC Chapter 4 specifies special detailed requirements based
on use and occupancy. NFPA 101 Chapter 18 shares the same hourly fire resistance
requirements as those stated in IBC.
From IBC Table 601, shown in Figure 12, the following elements require 1-hour fire resistive
ratings for type II buildings: primary structural frame, exterior bearing walls, interior bearing walls,
floor construction and associated secondary members, roof construction and associated
secondary members. IBC Table 602, shown as Figure 13, requires 1 hour fire-resistance rating
for the exterior wall based on separation distance for Group I Occupancy.
Shaft enclosures within the new building are 2-hour rated and the separation wall and door
assembly at the existing building is 2-hour rated.
IBC Chapter 7 specifies materials, systems, and assemblies permitted for use in the
structural fire resistance and fire-resistance-rated construction separation of adjacent
spaces to safeguard against the spread of fire and smoke within a building and the spread
of fire to or from buildings. This includes systems permitted to be used for caulking and
sealing around joints, penetrations, and openings in rated assemblies, known as
firestopping. Figure 7 and Figure 8 summarize the first and second floor fire resistance
components in this building. These figures also illustrate the smoke compartments and size.
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FIGURE 12 - IBC TABLE 601 FIRE RESISTANCE RATING REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDING ELEMENTS.
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FIGURE 13 - IBC TABLE 602 EXTERIOR WALL FIRE-RESISTANCE BASED ON SEPARATION DISTANCE.
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Compartmentation
Firestopping, an essential and often improperly installed, passive fire protection component in
maintaining the integrity of fire-rated assemblies; firestopping can deny the passage of flame
and products of combustion during a fire through building service penetrations in or through fire
or smoke rated walls, floors, or floor/ceiling assemblies. Firestop systems are an integral part of
fire protection engineering in commercial buildings and mandated by Federal and State laws
and life safety codes.

The International Firestop Council (IFC) defines firestopping as a process whereby certain
materials, some of them specially manufactured, are used to resist or stop the spread of fire and
its byproducts through openings made to accommodate penetrations in fire-rated walls, floors
and floor ceiling assemblies.

It is important to clarify firestops are often referred to as materials and devices used to seal the
opening around a penetrating item. “Firestops” alone are not tested by this standard, rather, this
standard encompasses testing of “firestop systems”. The inherent complexity in the interaction
of a penetrant and heat flux during a fire, the penetrated assembly, materials and/or devices
used to seal the penetrated item, and the size and shape of the penetrated opening, it is not
attainable to solely test a “firestop” to obtain fire resistance data.

ASTM International, formerly known as American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), is
an international standards organization that develops and publishes voluntary consensus
technical standards for a wide range of materials, products, systems, and services. The testing
method entitled ASTM E 814 -Standard Test Method for Fire Tests of Through Penetration Fire
Stops defines “firestop system” as a specific combination of penetrating item or items, the
specific construction that is penetrated, and the materials or devices, or both, that seal the
opening provided to accommodate one or more items that penetrate into or through a fireresistance rated assembly.
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In the United States, test specimens undergo rigorous testing in a controlled, laboratory
environment to the ASTM E 814 standard or the sister standard, UL 1479 entitled Standard for
Fire Tests of Penetration Firestops, in which both standard baseline testing prescriptions are
similar. UL1479 standard further expands testing and listing options, has better quality control,
and offer a follow-up service. Both require successfully passing a hose stream test (ASTM E2226
Standard Practice for Application of Hose Stream) and upon successful completion are awarded
an F (flame spread rating) and T (thermal conductivity rating) rating. Some manufacturers may
choose ASTM E814 (modified) testing protocol, this means the hose test was not performed on
the test specimen.

Model prescriptive building and life safety codes that require firestopping of through-penetrations
in rated walls referencing ASTM E 814 include: International Building Code (IBC), International
Fire Code (IFC), National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Life Safety Code (NFPA 101),
National Electrical Code (NFPA 70), NFPA 5000 (NFPA Building Code), and Legacy US building
codes (UBC, SBC, NBC, BOCA). Plumbing and mechanical codes refer to building codes where
breach of fire resistance construction is inherent.

Firestopping is being recognized as such a significant component in compartmentation (a
component to the life safety triangle – detection, suppression, and compartmentation) and
allowing more time for occupant egress during in a fire event, section 1705 of the 2012 and later
editions of the IBC require special inspection of firestop systems, fire-resistant joint systems and
perimeter fire containment systems installed in high-rise buildings or in buildings assigned to
Risk Category III or IV in accordance with 1604.5 to ensure proper installation and maintenance.
Risk Category III includes most healthcare facilities. Protection of penetrations and joints are
also prescribed by NFPA 101 section 8.4.4 and section 8.4.5 respectively. After several visits,
this building passed all firestopping inspections.
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Conclusion
This skilled nursing home project was designed and built as a Group I-2 (Institutional) having
IBC Type 2A, protected non-combustible construction. The NFPA 101 construction type is
Type II (111).

To occupy the facility, due to the non-compliant roof assembly, the State Fire Marshal and CMS
approved intumescent spray coating be applied to the entire underside of the untreated, OSB
roof deck; install automatic sprinklers throughout the attic; provide a complete, total coverage
fire alarm system throughout the newly constructed building. The facility is also required
annually, to complete a Fire Safety Evaluation System (FSES) based on 2013 edition of NFPA
101A, entitled Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety.

Lastly, the window openings between the new and existing buildings came into question during
this study. Review of available records suggested all the windows are standard glass windows
as is installed in the rest of the building. Both the new and existing buildings are fully sprinklered,
however, no window water curtain sprinkler protection (an exception to rated protective
openings) is provided at the appropriate exterior openings (Figure 10) as prescribed by IBC
Table 705.8, shown in Figure 11. Field inspection would be necessary to obtain as-built
measurements of building separation and window opening data to further validate or dismiss this
construction drawing observation. The following section analyzes the means of egress of the
building.
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Egress Analysis
Introduction
One of the many fire safety systems incorporated in this building is a defend-in-place evacuation
strategy minimizing the need to fully evacuate the building during a fire. This strategy involves
many passive building safety components working together. A fire in one area of a building
permits staff opportunity to relocate occupants by horizontal egress to the opposite side of a
rated wall within the building. A safe staging area referred to as smoke compartments, these
smoke compartments are composed of at least, one-hour fire rated assemblies, required by IBC
section 710.3, that encompass smoke sealed floors, walls, and ceiling assemblies, and include
self-closing, fire rated door assemblies.

A total concept approach prescribed in NFPA 101 section 18.1.1.3 requires the facility to be
designed, constructed, maintained, and operated to minimize the possibility of a fire emergency
requiring the evacuation of occupants. Operating and maintenance procedures require three
components to aid in the protection from fire and evacuation of the building. The design,
construction, and compartmentation of the facility; provision for detection, alarm, and
extinguishment; fire prevention procedures and planning, training, and drilling programs for the
isolation of fire, transfer of occupants to areas of refuge, or evacuation of the building.
The total area of the 2nd-floor is 31,595 ft2. Each smoke compartment on the 2nd - floor (shown
by green outline in Figure 14) employs two means of egress as required by NFPA 101 section
18.2.5.5. Each smoke compartment on the 2nd - floor (#5, #6, #7) each include one protected
stairwell for vertical egress to the 1st - floor. Smoke compartment #5 and #7 each have a total of
two exits. The maximum travel distance in smoke compartments #5 and #7 is 195 feet. Smoke
compartment #6 has four exits in total. The farthest distance of travel in smoke compartments
#5 and #7 is 195 feet. The farthest distance of travel in smoke compartment #6 is 98 feet. NFPA
101 section 18.2.6.2.2, prescribes the maximum travel distance allowed to an exit is 200-feet in
a sprinklered healthcare facility. All means of egress locations, ratings, separation, illumination,
and signage throughout the building meet or exceed prescriptive code requirements.
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Two large elevator cars (shown by red outline in Figure 14) are not included in the required
means of egress in this building. There are no dead-end corridors in this building.

In compliance with IBC section 706, the party wall separating the two buildings is constructed
as a fire wall with a two-hour fire resistance rating and includes a 90-minute rated self-closing
fire door assembly. Each of the three egress stairwells are constructed of concrete and have a
two-hour fire resistance rating with a 90-minute rated, self-closing door at the top and bottom of
each stairwell. The stairwell assemblies are compliant with NFPA 101 Chapter 7 and exceed the
fire resistance requirement minimum of one-hour rating specified by NFPA 101 section 7.1.3.2.
There are 12 self-closing rated fire door assemblies separating smoke compartments throughout
the building and employ approved panic hardware and are self-closing. These 12 rated fire
doors are held open by a wall mounted magnetic door hold-open device that all releases upon
the initiation of any FACP alarm signal. The doors to the resident rooms are all 90-minute fire
rated, solid wood doors with metal frame. The resident room doors do not have self-closing
devices install. All door assemblies in this facility are compliant with prescriptive code.
The 1st-floor, shown in Figure 15, also has the defend-in-place evacuation strategy like the 2ndfloor. The primary difference between the first and second floor egress is that the 1st-floor has
four horizontal means of egress to the exterior of the building. The 1st-floor also contains the
mechanical room and the main electrical room. Both floors in this two-story building have one
horizontal means of egress to the existing building. Smoke compartment #6 on the second floor
and smoke compartment #3 on the first floor, as shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15 respectively.
Both means of egress to the existing building are not being considered in the egress analysis.
Each smoke compartment on the 1 st-floor has one means of egress to the exterior and one
means of egress to an adjoining smoke compartment.

NFPA 101 section 18.3.7 prescribes the following requirements of smoke compartments: the
maximum area allowed in any smoke compartment is 22,500 ft2; not less than two means of
egress is required from each smoke compartment; the maximum travel distance from anywhere
in a smoke compartment to an egress door is 200 feet; divided in to not less than two smoke
compartments having 50 or more persons, regardless of use.
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FIGURE 14 - SECOND FLOOR PLAN DETAIL SHOWING COMPARTMENTS AND MEANS OF EGRESS.

The 1st-floor of the new building also encompasses three smoke compartments, shown in Figure
15 as number 1, 2, & 3. The combined total area of the floor is 32,540 ft2. The maximum travel
distance to a smoke barrier door from compartments one and two is 195 ft; the middle smoke
compartment, number three, the maximum travel distance to an egress door is 92 ft.

The 2007 minimum design standards for healthcare facilities in Michigan, Chapter 8, section 3A,
requires a minimum of 30 ft2 of floor space per resident bed be provided for dayroom, dining,
recreation, and activity purposes with a minimum total area of at least 225 ft2. At least 20 ft2 per
resident bed of this space shall be available for dining. These requirements are all met.

The total occupant load as specified in NFPA 101 Table 7.3.4.1 for healthcare use allows 240
ft2 per person for inpatient treatment departments, 120 ft2 per person for sleeping areas, and
100 ft2 for outpatient areas. Using the most restrictive of 240ft 2 per person, the maximum
occupant load for the 2nd-floor is 131 persons. The maximum occupant load for the 1st-floor is
135 persons. The first and second floor combined occupant load maximum capacity is 266
persons.
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FIGURE 15 - FIRST FLOOR PLAN DETAIL SHOWING COMPARTMENTS AND MEANS OF EGRESS.

Egress Capacity
Exit capacity for the 2nd-floor as prescribed in NFPA 101 Table 7.3.3.1 capacity factors for a
stairway in a sprinklered healthcare facility is 0.3-inches wide per person. For level components
and ramps in a sprinklered healthcare facility is 0.2-inches wide per person. The three exit
stairways on the 2nd-floor are each 44-inches wide with 34-inch clear width doors serving the
stairways.
Stairway Capacity: 44 in. / (0.3in / person) = 146 people
Exit Door Capacity: 34 in. / (0.2in / person) = 170 people.
The three, 2nd-floor stairways allow for 438 people; the three exit doors allow for 510 people.
The calculated egress capacity for the 2nd-floor is restricted by the stairway capacity of 438
people. With a calculated maximum 2nd-floor occupant load of 131 persons, sufficient exits
accommodate the occupant load of the 2nd-floor.
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The 1st-floor contains four exit doors having a 34-inch clear width. The first and second floor
calculated occupant load maximum capacity is 266 persons. The 1st-floor calculated egress
capacity to the outside employing four exit doors to the exterior is 680 persons. This value does
not include the egress door to the existing building. There are sufficient exits on the 1st-floor to
accommodate the occupant load of both floors.

Egress Design
The number of exits provided meet the minimum as prescribed by NFPA 101 section 18.2.4.
The exit arrangement is equally distributed and no travel distance in the building exceeds the
200-feet allowance in a sprinklered healthcare facility as prescribed by NFPA 101 section
18.2.6.2.2. All exit stairways in this facility have a fire resistance rating of 2-hours and are smoke
proof enclosures complying with NFPA 101 section 7.2.3. The exit stair is a typical 7/11 design,
e.g., 7-inch rise, 11-inch tread. The exit stairways and all floors have appropriate egress
illumination as required by NFPA 101 section 18.2.8. Marking the means of Egress per NFPA
101 section 18.2.10 is also compliant throughout.
Emergency power for emergency egress lighting as required by NFPA 101 section 18.2.9 is
supplied from a battery backup in each light, as well as the facilities standby generator that
services the entire building. Horizontal exits leading from one smoke compartment to another on
each floor use double door configurations, when both doors are fully open allow for 350-person
capacity. All means of egress interior finish requirements for the interior ceiling are class A rated
as permitted by NFPA 101 section 10.2. Means of egress wall finish is water-based paint. The
floor finish in the egress stairwell’s is concrete and plank flooring in the horizontal egress on both
floors. No combustible items or decorations are used in the means of egress or stairways. The
stairwell landings and handrails are compliant with IBC section 1009.5 stairway landings and
IBC section 1012 handrails.
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Occupant Characteristics
Occupants of this facility include staff, volunteers, and residents and their families. The residents
are mostly incapable of self-preservation because of age and physical or mental disability. The
facility reports 90-percent of their residents are mobility impaired and will require staff assistance
during an emergency. The resident families, in most cases, will be dependent upon staff for
emergency assistance during an evacuation due to lack of familiarization with the building.

The pre-movement times and movement times are expected to be slow and are heavily
dependent upon staff to be highly educated, well trained, and very responsive with evacuation
procedures. All staff, from every shift, are mandated to perform their assigned duties during
required, monthly fire drill practices.

By using NFPA 101A entitled Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety, in concert with
NFPA 101, we can facilitate an equivalency request using a numerically based fire safety
evaluation system (FSES). An FSES of each fire/smoke zone was performed and available for
review in Appendix D. Shown in Figure 16, concerning data from this evaluation included a
patient mobility risk factor of 3.2 with 1.0 being mobile and 4.5 being non-mobile; a ratio of
greater than 10 residents to one staff member; the average age of residents in the facility were
over the age of 65. This data provides a basis to expected lengthy evacuation time.

Having extensive experience in healthcare facility fire safety drills, the time to evacuate a smoke
compartment can be quite lengthy. The experience of the staff, mobility impairments of residents,
the resident to staff ratio, the size of smoke compartment, and distance to the exits are influential
components. Evacuating a 2nd-floor smoke compartment will be examined in the performancebased section of this report.
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FIGURE 16 - FSES SAMPLE DATA.

Egress Capabilities
Using the 20th edition NFPA Fire Protection Handbook Chapter 4, a calculated total evacuation
of the 2nd-floor is as follows:
Estimated flow capability (Fc) of a 44-inch stairway:
From Table 4.2.4, the effective width (We), for each stairway is 44 -12 in. = 32inches
(2.66ft). The maximum specific flow (Fsm) for the stairway (from table 4.2.8) is 18.5
persons/min./ft. effective width with a riser of 7.0 inches and a tread of 11.0 inches.
Specific flow (Fs) equals maximum specific flow. Therefore, using equation 4 (F c = Fs x
We), the flow from each stairway is limited to 18.5 x 2.66 = 49.2 persons/min. Three, 44inch-wide stairways will accommodate 147 persons/minute.
Estimated flow capacity (Fc) through a door:
The effective width, We, of each door is 36-12= 24in. (2ft). From Table 4.2.8, the maximum
specific flow through any 36-inch doorway is 24 persons/min/ft effective width. Again,
using equation 4 (Fc = Fs x We), the flow from each door is limited to 24 x 2 = 48
persons/min.
Three, 44-inch-wide stairways will accommodate 147 persons/minute. Since the flow of capacity
of the doors (48 x 3-doors = 144 persons/minute) is less than the flow capacity of the stairways
served, the flow is limited by the width of the stairway exit doors. The estimated time to evacuate
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the 2nd-floor of this building is (131ppl / 144 ppl /minute) 0.93 minutes. Obviously, this value
assumes all occupants are all fully capable of self-preservation and they are not.
This is facility being a healthcare facility, the resident pre-movement time could be several
minutes as staff must confirm an actual fire before any evacuation message is conveyed. The
factors influencing premovement time are many, including recognition, validation, definition,
evaluation, commitment, and reassessment. Premovement will be evaluated in the performancebased section of this report.

Occupant Elevator Egress
This facility has two elevator cars in the center smoke compartment. Several model codes in
recent years have allowed occupant elevator egress based on certain criteria being met.
• Added 2009edition - IBC S3008
3008.3 Operation. The occupant evacuation elevators shall be used for occupant self-evacuation only in the
normal elevator operating mode prior to Phase I Emergency Recall Operation in accordance with the
requirements in ASME A17.1/CSA B44 and the building's fire safety and evacuation plan.
• Added 2012edition - NFPA 101
S7.14 Elevators for Occupant-Controlled Evacuation Prior to Phase I Emergency Recall Operations.
S7.14.1.2 The provisions of section 7.14 shall not apply where the limited or supervised use of elevators
for evacuation is part of a formal or informal evacuation strategy, including the relocation or evacuation of
patients in healthcare occupancies and the relocation or evacuation of occupants with disabilities in other
occupancies.
• Added 2013edition - ASME A17.1/CSA B44 – Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, section 2.27.11
• Added 2013edition - NFPA 72 - National Fire Alarm & Signaling Code, section 21.6

Inquiry determined this facility does not employ Occupant Elevator Evacuation in their
evacuation plan. An analysis of this option was first explored early in the Performance-Based
Design section of this report. While very effective in evacuating the 2nd-floor, advisors suggested
the intent to safe refuge was to escape the smoke compartment involved with fire. In addition,
the building being studied has egress to the existing building from both floors where occupants
could be quickly directed in the event of a complete evacuation was deemed necessary. The
Occupant Elevator Evacuation section therefore was omitted from this report.
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Conclusion
The defend-in-place evacuation strategy minimizing the need to fully evacuate the building
during a fire is one of the strongest assets of egress in this building. This asset is only functional
when the proper operating and maintenance procedures are put into practice.

The farthest distance of travel in any compartment in this building is 195 feet to a means of
egress and is less than the 200 feet maximum allowed in a fully sprinklered building. This
prescription, however, fails to consider mobility impaired occupants and the extensive travel
times associated with these occupants and that they are nearly all dependent upon staff to assist
in an evacuation. The facility is compliant with ceiling mounted emergency egress signage and
lighting to direct persons to means of egress during an emergency. The exit signs have red
illuminated letters and the emergency lighting is white. Both are connected to the facility standby
generator.

All egress doors and stairwells are compliant to evacuate the occupant load of the building. In
the event of a major fire where full building evacuation is deemed necessary, 2 nd-floor vertical
egress will take a considerable amount of time to accomplish. This is due to most of the
occupants are not capable of self-preservation and require assistance, be it from staff, walkers,
canes, wheelchairs, or a combination thereof. The stairwells were not designed to accommodate
wheelchairs and therefore would likely get congested with slow moving occupants, staff using
vertical evacuation tools to transport victims safely down the stairs. The fastest way to evacuate
the entire 2nd-floor during an emergency is to retreat horizontally into the protected existing
building.

The fire alarm system upon alarm activation starts the evacuation process. Fire detection, alarm
and communication systems will be discussed in the next section.
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Fire Detection, Alarm and Communication Systems
Introduction
NFPA 101 section 9.6 has several prescriptions specific to fire detection, alarm, and
communication systems and references applicable requirements of NFPA 72 entitled National
Fire Alarm and Signaling Code and NFPA 70 entitled National Electric Code to ensure
operational integrity.
The type and model of fire alarm system being installed in a 1st-floor mechanical room is the
NOTIFIER NFS2-3030, shown in Figure 17. The NFS2-3030 is an intelligent fire alarm control
panel (FACP) designed for medium to large-scale facilities. The NFS2-3030 is part of the
ONYX® series of products from Notifier, a Honeywell product. The operating characteristics of
the NFS2-3030 include built-in alarm, trouble, security, and supervisory relays; one to ten
signaling line circuits (SLCs).

FIGURE 17 - NOTIFIER NFS2-3030 FIRE ALARM CONTROL PANEL.
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The NFS2-3030 supports up to 3,180 intelligent addressable devices; the NFS2-3030’s has a
large 640-character liquid crystal display (LCD) that presents vital information to operators
concerning a fire situation, fire progression, and evacuation details and a host of other options
are available, including single- or multichannel voice; firefighters telephone; LED, LCD, or PCbased graphic annunciators; fire or integration networking; advanced detection products for
challenging environments, and many other additional options.
NFPA 72 section 10.5 discusses the minimum requirements of the fire alarm systems power
supply. In short, the prescriptive code requires independent and reliable primary and secondary
power supplies. The secondary source shall provide power for 24 continuous hours, followed by
five minutes with the system in alarm status, unless there is an automatic-starting, engine-driven
generator and that system requires 4-hours of battery capacity. The facility has a large
automatic-starting, diesel engine-driven generator that powers the new and existing buildings
during primary power outages. For purposes of the fire alarm system secondary power supply,
batteries are used.
With the primary commercial power source disconnected, as well as, the emergency generator,
the system was tested on batteries only for 24 hours followed by 5 minutes of alarm status as
required by NFPA 72 section 10.5.6.3.1 and successfully passed. The FACP requires 5.00 Amps
from a 120-volt alternating current (AC) circuit. 0.35 Amps in non-alarm conditions and 4.41
Amps in alarm conditions. The secondary load requirement is 10.56 Amp hours. The four, 12volt direct current (DC) batteries (two in-parallel) were installed and provide 24 Amp hours of
backup power leaving 56% spare battery capacity.
The additional power supply (FCPS-24S8) installed due to the additional notification appliances
required 3.20 Amps from a 120-volt AC circuit. 0.09 Amps in non-alarm conditions and 3.57
Amps in alarm conditions. The secondary load requirement is 2.23 Amp Hours. The two, 12-volt
DC batteries (in-parallel) were installed and provided 7 Amp hours of backup leaving 68% spare
battery capacity.
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The calculations assume a worst-case source voltage as measured by UL with the batteries
depleted to 20.4 volts. Under AC power and for most of the drain cycle of the batteries, the circuit
voltages will be substantially higher and thus, would support a greater number of devices. A
device's minimum operating voltage is derived from the UL-requirement that it operate within a
regulated voltage range of 16-volt DC to 33-volt DC.
There are four, notification appliance circuit’s (NAC) in the FACP and four NACs in the secondary
power supply (FCPS-24S8). Using 14 AWG copper wire, at 1.5 Amps and source voltage of
20.40 volts DC low battery, the voltage drop analysis from applicable devices connected to
NAC’s 1-4 use 1.4760, 1.2570, 0.8080, 0.6120 Amps and 5.88, 6.58, 3.02, 2.09 % voltage drop
respectively. The secondary power supply also using 14 AWG copper wire, at 3.0 Amps and
source voltage of 20.40 volts DC low battery, the voltage drop analysis from applicable devices
connected to NAC’s 1-4 use 1.0310, 0.9760, 0.8080, 0.6120 Amps and 4.82, 5.84, 3.28, 2.58%
voltage drop respectively.
Located in Appendix A of this report are the complete system design battery calculations and
voltage drop calculations prepared for the NACs.

Sequence of Operations
The sequence of operations matrix shown in Figure 18, summarizes the FACP conditions with
appropriate actions. Observation revealed the matrix is missing magnetic door hold open
devices that release during alarm conditions.
All manual pull stations, smoke detectors, and fire sprinkler waterflow switches initiate alarm
conditions at the FACP and remote annunciator, transmit alarm signal to the central monitoring
station, and activate audible/visible notification appliances throughout the facility.
Automatic sprinkler system valve tamper switches and duct smoke detectors annunciate
supervisory conditions at the FACP and remote annunciator, transmit supervisory signal to the
central monitoring station, and return air units (RTU) at activated duct smoke detector shuts
down.
Field serviceable appliance (FSA) trouble condition, signal line circuit (SLC) and notification
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appliance circuit (NAC) trouble condition, loss of primary power, low battery condition and
disconnection of battery annunciate trouble conditions at the fire alarm control panel and remote
annunciator and transmit trouble signals to central monitoring station.
Operator acknowledgement of alarm signal at FACP or FSA deactivates audible/visual
notification appliances and silences the internal audible device at the FACP and FSA. Operator
acknowledgement of trouble or supervisory signal at FACP or FSA silences the internal audible
device at the FACP and FSA.
System reset at control panel after alarm, trouble, or supervisory cleared reset signal sent to
central monitoring station, audible/visible notification appliances throughout the facility
deactivated, and silences the internal audible device at the FACP and FSA.

Signal Initiation
NFPA 101 section 9.6.2.1 where required by other sections of this Code, actuation of the
complete fire alarm system shall be initiated by, but shall not be limited to, any or all of the
following means:
(1) Manual fire alarm initiation
(2) Automatic detection
(3) Extinguishing system operation
Installation of the NBG-12LX and many other initiating devices will mount semi-flush into a
single-gang, double-gang, or standard 4" (10.16 cm) square electrical outlet box or will surface
mount to the model SB-10 or SB-I/O surface back box. If the NBG-12LX is being semi-flush
mounted, then the optional trim ring (BG12TR) may be used. The BG12TR is usually needed for
semi-flush mounting with 4" (10.16 cm) or double-gang boxes (not with single-gang boxes).
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FIGURE 18 - SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS MATRIX.
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Manual Fire Alarm Initiation
Manually activated fire alarm pull stations shall be located within 60 inches (1.52 m) of and exit
doorway opening at each exit, on each floor. Additional pull stations are required to be provided
so that the travel distance to the nearest pull station will not exceed 200 feet (61.0 m), measured
horizontally on the same floor. Additionally, each manual pull station is required be securely
mounted with the operable part not less than 42 inches (1.07 m) and not more than 48 inches
(1.22 m) above floor level.

The NOTIFIER NBG-12LX Addressable Manual Pull Station as shown in Figure 19, was used
throughout the facility.

FIGURE 19 - MANUAL PULL STATION.
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Automatic Detection
Spot-type smoke and heat detection devices were all installed throughout on the ceilings of the
building. Detector spacing was installed based upon smooth ceilings protection for spot-type
smoke detectors. A nominal 30 foot, +/− 5 percent (maximum 31 ft – 6 in) smoke detector
spacing was utilized in rectangular shaped areas.

This facility is also employing open area detection to omit the smoke detection requirements for
magnetic door hold open devices. In irregular shaped areas, the spacing between detectors is
permitted to be greater than the listed spacing, provided that the maximum spacing from a
detector to the farthest point of a sidewall or corner within its zone of protection is not greater
than 0.7 times the listed spacing. Figure 20 represents detector spacing as extracted from
Appendix A of NFPA 72 shown for quick illustration.

NOTIFIER FSP-851(A) series intelligent plug-in smoke detectors with integral communication
provide features that surpass conventional detectors. Detector sensitivity can be programmed
in the control panel software and range from 0.5% to 2.35% per foot obscuration. Sensitivity is
continuously monitored and reported to the panel. Operating Temperature range is 0°C to 49°C
(32°F to 120°F) and has a 10% to 93% noncondensing relative humidity range. Point
identification (ID) capability allows each detector’s address to be set with rotary, decimal address
switches, providing exact detector location for selective maintenance when chamber
contamination reaches an unacceptable level.
The FSP-851(A) photoelectric detector’s unique optical sensing chamber is engineered to sense
smoke produced by a wide range of combustion sources. Dual electronic thermistors add 135°F
(57°C) fixed-temperature thermal sensing on the FSP- 851T(A). The FSP-851R(A) is a remote
test capable detector for use with DNR(A)/DNRW duct detector housings. FSP-851(A) series
detectors are compatible with Notifier Onyx and CLIP series Fire Alarm Control Panels.
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FIGURE 20 - NFPA 72 DETECTOR SPACING.

Copyright © 2021 by Edward Hale, All Rights Reserved.

Page 48 of 263

The NOTIFIER FSP-851(A) series intelligent plug-in photoelectric smoke detector, shown in
Figure 21, were utilized throughout the facility to comply with requirements as noted below in all
zones of the facility except where conducive to nuisance alarms, e.g., front entrance vestibule,
elevator shafts, shower/spa rooms, and the attic.

FIGURE 21 - NOTIFIER FSP-851(A).

Due to the roof non-compliance, CMS by referenced of NFPA 101, required the facility use NFPA
101A, entitled Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety and complete a Fire Safety
Evaluation System (FSES) to evaluate equivalency. As a result of the FSES provided in
Appendix D, a complete (total) smoke detection system was specified to participate in federal
funding from CMS.

Dozens of additional smoke detectors were installed throughout the building. The primary area
was the interstitial area between the 2nd-floor and the attic. The two stairwells and a few small
storage rooms received detector coverage as well. Locations exempt from installation were
areas of the building prone to false alarms or in areas with conditions that detectors were not
listed for (attic, shower/bathrooms, elevator shafts, mechanical rooms).

NFPA 101 section 3-6.12.5 total spaces in zone is defined as the total space provision of
detectors includes detector coverage of all spaces except noncombustible building voids that
contain no combustible materials. The total space credit is to be given if the zone measured
meets this criterion, regardless of the presence or lack of detectors in other portions of the
building.
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NFPA 72, specifies that a total (complete) smoke detection system is described as follows:
2-1.4.2* Detector coverage.
2-1.4.2.1 Total (complete) coverage.
If required, total coverage shall include all rooms, halls, storage areas, basements, attics, lofts,
spaces above suspended ceilings, and other subdivisions and accessible spaces, and the inside
of all closets, elevator shafts, enclosed stairways, dumbwaiter shafts, and chutes. Inaccessible
areas shall not be required to be protected by detectors.

Exception No. 1: If inaccessible areas contain combustible material, they shall be made
accessible and shall be protected by a detector(s).

Exception No. 2: Detectors shall not be required in combustible blind spaces if any of the
following conditions exist:
(a)

Where the ceiling is attached directly to the underside of the supporting
beams of a combustible roof or floor deck

(b)

Where the concealed space is entirely filled with a noncombustible insulation
(In solid joist construction, the insulation shall be required to fill only the
space from the ceiling to the bottom edge of the joist of the roof or floor
deck.)

(c)

Where there are small, concealed spaces over rooms, provided any space
in question does not exceed 50 ft2 (4.6 m2) in area

(d)

In spaces formed by sets of facing studs or solid joists in walls, floors, or
ceilings where the distance between the facing studs or solid joists is less
than 6 in. (150 mm)

Exception No. 3: Detectors shall not be required below open grid ceilings if all of the
following conditions exist:
(a)

Openings of the grid are 1/4 in. (6.4 mm) or larger in the least dimension.

(b)

Thickness of the material does not exceed the least dimension.

(c)

Openings constitute at least 70 percent of the area of the ceiling material.
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Exception No. 4: Concealed, accessible spaces above suspended ceilings that are used
as a return air plenum meeting the requirements of NFPA 90A, entitled Standard for the
Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems, where equipped with smoke
detection at each connection from the plenum to the central air-handling system.

Exception No. 5: Detectors shall not be required underneath open loading docks or
platforms and their covers and for accessible underfloor spaces if all of the following
conditions exist:
(a)

Space is not accessible for storage purposes or entrance of unauthorized
persons and is protected against the accumulation of windborne debris.

(b)

Space contains no equipment such as steam pipes, electric wiring, shafting,
or conveyors.

(c)

Floor over the space is tight.

(d)

No flammable liquids are processed, handled, or stored on the floor above.

Duct - Smoke Detectors
NFPA 90A – 2010 section 6.4 Smoke detectors listed for use in air distribution systems are
located as follows:
1. Downstream of the air filters and ahead of any branch connections in air supply systems
having a capacity greater than 944 L/sec (2000 cfm)
2. At each story prior to the connection to a common return and prior to any recirculation or
fresh air inlet connection in air return systems having a capacity greater than 7080 L/sec
(15,000 cfm) and serving more than one story.

Return system smoke detectors are not required where the entire space served by the air
distribution system is protected by a system of area smoke detectors, or for fan units whose sole
function is to remove air from the inside of the building to the outside of the building.

Where provided, duct smoke detectors are required to be provided with a remote test station.
Duct smoke detectors are required to automatically stop their respective fan(s) upon detecting
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the presence of smoke. The Honeywell InnovairFlex® DNR(A) shown in Figure 22, is an
intelligent non-relay photoelectric duct smoke detector featuring a pivoting housing that fits both
square and rectangular footprints capable of mounting to a round or rectangular duct.
The duct smoke detector, with its NEMA-4 rating, is listed as a watertight, UV resistant enclosure
providing protection against falling dirt, rain, and windblown dust, splashing and hose directed
water, allowing operators to use the detector in the most extreme environments.

FIGURE 22 - INNOVAIRFLEX® DNR(A).

These units sense smoke in the most challenging conditions, operating in airflow speeds of 100
to 4,000 feet per minute (0.5 to 20.32 m/s), temperatures of -4°F to 158°F (-20°C to 70°C), and
a humidity range of 0 to 95 percent (non-condensing).
An improved cover design isolates the sensor head, which allows for ease of maintenance. A
cover tamper feature indicates a trouble signal for a removed or improperly installed sensor
cover. The housing provides a 3/4-inch conduit knockout and ample space to facilitate easy
wiring and mounting of a relay module. The duct smoke detector can be customized to meet
local codes and specifications without additional wiring.

Copyright © 2021 by Edward Hale, All Rights Reserved.

Page 52 of 263

Smoke Detector Response Time
Detector response parameters include Notifier FSP-851(A) Series intelligent plug-in smoke
detectors with integral communication provide features that surpass conventional detectors.
Detector sensitivity can be programmed in the control panel software. Smoke detector sensitivity
is continuously monitored and reported to the panel. Point ID capability allows each detector’s
address to be set with rotary, decimal address switches, providing exact smoke detector location
for selective maintenance when chamber contamination reaches an unacceptable level. The
FSP-851(A) photoelectric detector’s unique optical sensing chamber is engineered to sense
smoke produced by a wide range of combustion sources.

Dual electronic thermistors add 135°F (57°C) fixed temperature thermal sensing on the FSP851T(A). The FSP- 851R(A) is a remote test capable detector for use with DNR(A)/DNRW duct
detector housings. FSP-851(A) series detectors are compatible with Notifier Onyx and CLIP
series Fire Alarm Control Panels.

Continued fire growth is another consideration for response time estimation. A smoke
detector located at the center of a 12’- long x 17’- wide resident room, and assuming the
fire were to burn in the center of the room along the 12’ wall, the radial distance for the
smoke detector is 6 feet. The radial distance represents the horizontal distance from the
fire to the detector not to exceed 0.7071 or 1/2√2 of the listed spacing of the detector.

The actuation temperature of the smoke detector is 61.7°C based upon an assumed 20 °C
ambient temperature and 41.7 °C (NFPA 72 – Table B.4.7.5.3) for wood material fires
utilizing a scattered temperature rise. Since smoke detectors do not actuate based upon
heat, a low RTI value of 5(m-s) 1/2 is used. An assumed heat release rate of 86 kW per
BTU/s (steady state) was used based upon an estimated Heat Release Rate of the
dresser (Figure 59) at 60 seconds. The distance (height) between the top of the fuel and
the ceiling is 1.52 meter (5.0 feet). The calculated results for the smoke detector response
time used three methods discussed in class. Method of Alpert shown in Figure 23, Method
of Mowrer shown in Figure 24, and Method of Milke shown in Figure 25. The methods
resulted in varying smoke detector response times of 20.84 seconds for method of Alpert,
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0.81 seconds for method of Mowrer and 0.15 seconds for method of Milke. In comparison,
the room smoke detector in the design fire simulation in the performance-based section of
this report resulted in response time of 3.2 seconds.

The input parameters used in the smoke detector response time calculations are based on
principles developed in the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 3 rd edition.
Calculations are based on certain assumptions and have inherent limitations. The results
of such calculations may or may not have reasonable predictive capabilities for a given
situation and should only be interpreted by an informed user. The calculated results provide
no guarantee to the accuracy of these calculations.

Smoke Detector Response Time Calculation Assumed Input Parameters:
Heat Release Rate of the Fire in (Steady State) =
Radial Distance to the detector (r) **never more than 0.707 or 1/2√2 of the listed spacing** =
Height of Ceiling above Top of Fuel (H) =
r/H
=
Activation Temperature of Smoke Detector (Tactivation) =
Smoke Detector Response Time Index (RTI) =
Ambient Air Temperature (Ta) =
Convective Heat Release Rate Fraction (cc) =
Plume Leg Time Constant (Cpl) =
Ceiling Jet Lag Time Constant (Ccj) =
Temperature Rise of Gases Under the Ceiling (DT c) =

86.00 kW
2.00
m
1.52
m
1.32
61.70
°C
5.00 (m-sec)1/2
20.00
°C
0.70
0.67
1.20
10.00
°C

Smoke Detector Response Time Calculation - Method of Albert
(NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 19 th edition, Pg 3-140. This method assumes the smoke detector is a low RTI
device with a fixed activation temperature):

tactivation = (RTI/(√ujet)) (ln ((Tjet - Ta)/(Tjet - Tactivation)))
Where
tactivation = detector activation time (sec)
RTI = detector response time index (m-sec)1/2
ujet = ceiling jet velocity (m/sec)
Tjet = ceiling jet temperature (°C)
Ta = ambient air temperature (°C)
Tactivation = activation temperature of detector (°C)
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Ceiling Jet Temperature Calculation
Tjet - Ta = 16.9 (Q)2/3/H5/3

for r/H ≤ 0.18

Tjet - Ta = 5.38 (Q/r)2/3/H

for r/H > 0.18

Where
Tjet = ceiling jet temperature (°C)
Ta = ambient air temperature (°C)
Q = heat release rate of the fire (kW)
H = height of ceiling above top of fuel (m)
r = radial distance from the plume centerline to the detector (m)
Convective Heat Release Rate Calculation
Q c = Xc Q
Where
Qc = convective portion of the heat release rate (kW)
Q = heat release rate of the fire (kW)

Xc = convective heat release rate fraction
Qc =60.2 kW
Radial Distance to Ceiling Height Ratio Calculation
r/H =1.32

=

where r/H > 0.18 = 43.44

r/H is > 0.18
where r/H < 0.18 = 163.86

Tjet - Ta = 5.38 ((Q/r)2/3)/H
Tjet - Ta = 43.44
Tjet =

63.44 (°C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity Calculation
ujet = 0.96 (Q/H)1/3

for r/H ≤ 0.15

ujet= (0.195 Q1/3 H1/2)/r5/6

for r/H > 0.15

Where
ujet = ceiling jet velocity (m/sec)
Q = heat release rate of the fire (kW)
H = height of ceiling above top of fuel (m)
r = radial distance from the plume centerline to the detector (m)
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Radial Distance to Ceiling Height Ratio Calculation
r/H =1.32

=

where r/H > 0.15 = 0.60

r/H > 0.15
where r/H < 0.15 = 3.69

ujet =(0.195 Q1/3 H1/2)/r5/6
ujet =0.596 m/sec
Smoke Detector Response Time Calculation
tactivation =(RTI/(√ujet)) (ln (Tjet - Ta)/(Tjet - Tactivation))
tactivation = 20.84 sec
FIGURE 23 – METHOD OF ALBERT.
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Smoke Detector Response Time Calculation - Method of Mowrer
(Mowrer, F., “Lag Times Associated with Fire Detection and Suppression,” Fire Technology, August 1990 , p.244.)

tactivation = tpl + tcj
Where
tactivation = detector activation time (sec)
tpl = transport lag time of plume (sec)
tcj = transport lag time of ceiling jet (sec)
Transport Lag Time of Plume Calculation
tpl = Cpl (H)4/3/(Q)1/3
Where
tpl = tpl = transport lag time of plume (sec)
Cpl = Cpl = plume lag time constant
H = H = height of ceiling above top of fuel (m)
Q = Q = heat release rate of the fire (kW)
tpl =0.27 sec
Transport Lag Time of Ceiling Jet Calculation
tcj =(r)11/6/(ccj) (Q)1/3 (H)1/2
Where
tcj = tcj = transport lag time of ceiling jet (sec)
ccj = ccj = ceiling jet lag time constant
r = r = radial distance from the plume centerline to the detector(m)
H= H= height of ceiling above top of fuel (m)
Q = Q = heat release rate of fire (kW)
tcj = 0.55 sec
Smoke Detector Response Time Calculation
tactivation = tpl + tcj
tactivation = 0.81 sec
FIGURE 24 – METHOD OF MOWRER.

Copyright © 2021 by Edward Hale, All Rights Reserved.

Page 57 of 263

Smoke Detector Response Time Calculation - Method of Milke
(Milke, J., “Smoke Management for covered Malls and Atria“, Fire Technology, August 1990, p.233.)

tactivation = X H4/3 / Q1/3
Where
tactivation = detector activation time (sec)
X = 4.6 10-4 Y2 + 2.7 10-15 Y6
H = height of ceiling above top of fuel (ft)
Q = heat release rate from steady fire (BTU/sec)
Where
Y = ∆Tc H5/3 / Q2/3
∆Tc = temperature rise of gases under the ceiling for smoke detector to activate (°C)
Before estimating smoke detector response time, stratification effects can be calculated. NFPE 92B, 200
edition, Section A.3.4 provides the following correlation to estimate smoke stratification in a compartment.

Hmax =74 Qc2/5 / ∆Tf->c3/5
Where
Hmax = the maximum ceiling clearance to which a plume can rise (ft)
Qc = convective portion of the heat release rate (Btu/sec)
∆Tf->c = difference in temperature due to fire between the fuel location and ceiling level (°F)
Convective Heat Release Rate Calculation
Qc = Q Xc
Where
Qc = convective portion of the heat release rate (kW)
Q = heat release rate of the fire (kW)
Xc = convective heat release rate fraction
Qc = 60.20 kW

=

57.0264 BTU/sec

Difference in Temperature Due to Fire Between the Fuel Location and Ceiling Level
∆Tf->c = 1,300 Qc2/3 / H5/3
Where
∆Tf->c = difference in temperature due to fire between the fuel location and ceiling level (°F)
Qc = convective portion of the heat release rate (Btu/sec)
H = ceiling height above the fire source (ft)
∆Tf->c = 717.31 °C
=
1323.16 °F
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Smoke Stratification Effects
Hmax =74 Qc2/5 / ∆Tf->c3/5
Hmax = 1.52 m

=

5.00 ft

In this case, the highest point of smoke rise is estimated to be 1.52 m. Thus, the smoke would
be expected to reach the ceiling mounted smoke detector.
Y = ∆Tc H5/3 / Q2/3
Y = 12.97
X = 4.6 10-4 Y2 + 2.7 10-15 Y6
X = 0.08

Smoke Detector Response Time Calculation
tactivation = X H4/3/Q1/3
tactivation = 0.15 sec

FIGURE 25 – METHOD OF MILKE.
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Thermal (Heat) Detectors
NOTIFIER FST-851(A) series intelligent plug-in thermal detectors with integral communication
has features that surpass conventional detectors. Point identification capability allows each
detector’s address to be set with rotary, decimal address switches, providing exact detector
locations. FST-851(A) series thermal detectors (shown in Figure 26) use an innovative
thermistor sensing circuit to produce 135°F/57°C fixed-temperature activation and a rate-of-rise
thermal detection in a low-profile package.

FST-851H(A) also provides for a fixed high-temperature detection of 190°F/88°C. These thermal
detectors provide effective, intelligent property protection in a variety of applications. FST-851(A)
series detectors are compatible with the Notifier Onyx and CLIP series Fire Alarm Control
Panels.

FlashScan® is a communication protocol developed by Notifier Engineering that greatly
enhances the speed of communication between analog intelligent devices and certain
NOTIFIER systems. Intelligent devices communicate in a grouped fashion. If one of the devices
within the group has new information, the panel’s CPU stops the group poll and concentrates on
single points. The net effect is a response speed greater than five times that of earlier designs.
There are eight, FST-851 (A) devices in this facility. Four of them located in the warming
kitchens, two located in mechanical rooms, and one at the top of each elevator shaft.

FIGURE 26 - FST-851(A) HEAT DETECTOR.
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Wet Pipe Sprinkler System Water Flow Switch
The operation of a wet pipe sprinkler system depends on the heat reactive sprinkler heads.
When a fire starts, its heat causes a fusible glass bulb head to shatter, releasing the plug and
water begins to flow. The straight pipe riser within the sprinkler system has a vane type water
flow switch (Figure 27) to monitor water flow in the sprinkler system.

When a continuous flow of water of more than 10 gallons per minute occurs, the water flow
switch monitors the system and activates an alarm after a predetermined amount of time. Less
than 90-seconds is required. Typically, 30 to 45 second setting prevents short duration water
surges from causing a false alarm. If water surges beyond the predetermined set time, a signal
will be sent to the FACP and a water flowing alarm condition will activate the audible and visual
devices throughout the facility. Unlike the smoke or heat detector point ID’s that can identify
precise detector location, sprinkler heads do not have this premium feature. The flow switch ID
is specific to a riser. The user will need to know what area (zone) the applicable riser is connected
to (if more than one) and start searching for the fire in that area. The design of this building has
two risers, one for the attic (dry pipe system) and one for the rest of the building (wet pipe
system).
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FIGURE 27 - POTTER VANE-TYPE WATER FLOW SWITCH.

Dry Pipe Sprinkler System Pressure Switches
In a dry pipe sprinkler system, there are two pressure switches connected to the fire alarm control
panel. An alarm pressure switch and a supervisory low/high air pressure switch, both shown in
Figure 28, as red rectangular shaped boxes on the upper left. Both switches monitor the air
pressure on the system side of the dry pipe valve. Alarm pressure switches measure pressure
changes within the system and send signal to the FACP at a desired pressure setting.
Supervisory low/high air pressure switches monitor air pressure on the system side of the dry
pipe valve. A signal is sent to the FACP when either switch reach their appropriate setting.

They perform the following two functions: The supervisory switch monitors low and high air
pressure and prevents the accidental operation of the dry pipe valve due to low air pressure from
an air compressor failure or other leaks in the system. This same supervisory switch also
monitors high air pressure to prevent damage to the clapper and rubber gaskets in the dry pipe
valve. High pressure can also damage the pipe. If air pressure is too high, the valve won’t
operate until it bleeds off the extra system air causing a delay of the dry pipe valve opening that
allows water to enter the sprinkler pipe.
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Figure 28 - Dry Pipe Pressure SWITCHES.

Sprinkler System Water Supply Attachments
Required by NFPA 101 section 9.7.2.1 control valves are installed and monitored for integrity in
accordance with NFPA 72 and are alarmed by a supervisory signal at the FACP to indicate a
condition that would impair the satisfactory operation of the sprinkler system. This system has
five control valves, four are shown in Figure 29. The fifth control valve is on the post indicator
valve for the underground main water supply located outside the facility. A backflow preventor
is also installed in the sprinkler water supply line, shown in Figure 29, between the first and
second main control valves. The backflow preventor purpose is to prevent sprinkler system water
from reverse flowing into the domestic water supply.
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FIGURE 29 - SUPERVISED SPRINKLER SYSTEM CONTROL VALVES.

Kitchen Hood Suppression System
Wet chemical extinguishing agent is employed at four pre-engineered kitchen hood suppression
systems in this facility, two on each floor. Wet chemical agent is extremely effective on fires
involving restaurant cooking equipment and appliances. When the agent reacts with hot grease,
it forms a layer of foam on the surface and acts as an insulator between the hot grease and the
atmosphere removing oxygen from the fire.
The Notifier FACP monitors each of the four pre-engineered systems in this facility by an
addressable module. Upon activation of the manual pull station or from the heating and
separation of a fusible link, the FACP receives an addressable alarm signal identifying which
system was activated and the FACP responds with an alarm signal to the notifications devices
throughout the facility. All four of these systems were thoroughly inspected and successfully
passed.
The kitchen hood suppression system and ventilation methods by reference from NFPA 101, is
installed, inspected, tested, and maintained by NFPA 96 entitled Standard for Ventilation Control
and Fire Protection of Commercial Cooking Operations.
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Notification Devices
The SpectrAlert advance series ceiling mount horn/strobes, as shown in Figure 30, are listed
and employed throughout this facility. Features include plug-in design, field selectable candela
settings, three volume settings, universal mounting plate, and compatible with the MDL sync
module.

Spacing of ceiling mounted visible notification appliances as prescribed by 2010 edition NFPA
72 section 18.5.4 and shall be in accordance with Table 18.5.4.3.1(b) (shown in Figure 31) and
used where a ceiling mounted visible notification appliance is placed in the center of the room.
When the appliance is not located at the center of the room, the effective intensity (cd) is
determined by doubling the distance from the appliance to the farthest wall to obtain the
maximum room size as prescribed by NFPA 72 section 18.5.4.3.7.

FIGURE 30 - CEILING STROBE/HORN.

Because occupants are usually alert and moving when in a corridor and their vision is focused
by the narrowness of a corridor, signaling is permitted to be by direct viewing of lower-intensity
(15 cd) visual appliances in corridors 20 ft or less in width. That is, the alerting is intended to be
done by direct viewing of the strobe, not necessarily by its reflection off surfaces (indirect
viewing) as required for rooms.
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FIGURE 31 - NFPA 72 TABLE 18.5.4.3.1(B) ROOM SPACING FOR CEILING-MOUNTED VISIBLE APPLIANCES.

Placement is acceptable to use ‘spacing in room’ prescriptions to determine the number and
location of strobes in corridors are warranted or when the corridor is wider than 20 ft. Where this
option is used, it is not necessary to have a corridor strobe within 15 ft (4.5 m) of the end of the
corridor.
In corridors less than 20 ft wide, visible notification appliances shall be located not more than 15
ft (4.57 m) from the end of the corridor with a separation not greater than 100 ft (30.5 m) between
visual appliances. Where there are more than two appliances in a field of view, they need to be
synchronized. If there is an interruption of the concentrated viewing path, such as a fire door, an
elevation change, or any other obstruction, the area shall be treated as a separate corridor.
No sleeping areas had visible notification appliances installed in this facility. All the audio/ visual
notification appliances installed in this facility meet the NFPA 72 standard prescription for
effective intensity requirements for the given room or space installed and no performance-based
alternative notification measures were employed at this facility.
Appliance locations were field measured and verified to meet or exceed NFPA 72 spacing
requirements. It was verified the candela rating marking of each device agreed with the approved
drawings or NFPA 72 effective intensity requirements for the area employed. All devices were
confirmed to function as intended during alarm conditions.
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90% of the occupants at this healthcare facility are incapable of evacuating themselves because
of age, physical or mental disability and rely on staff for evacuation from the zone, floor, or
building that would be affected by a fire.
The facility has sound reflective flooring throughout. The audio/visual devices installed
generously throughout the facility were approved for private audio mode for attendant notification
and notification was clearly heard. The average ambient sound level in testing several
operational long term care facilities having similar interior furnishings and during normal
business hours was 53 dBA using ANSI approved sound meter. At least 10 dB above the
average ambient sound level is required in private mode measured 5-feet above the floor, the
lowest reading obtained during testing was 72 dBA on the low setting.

The audible horn option of this appliance has three audibility settings of low, medium, and high,
as well as an option to switch between a temporal three pattern and a non-temporal (continuous)
pattern, shown in Figure 32. These options are set by a multiple position switch. Temporal three
pattern was used in this facility and audible setting of low was determined to meet private mode
audible prescriptions of this 24-volt alarm system. A general rule of thumb for the output dBA of
an audible appliance is reduced by 6dB when the distance from the audible appliance is doubled.

FIGURE 32 - HORN STROBE TONE SOUND OUTPUT DATA (DBA).
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Initial and reacceptance testing shall comply with the following: Sound pressure levels for signals
shall be measured with a sound level meter meeting ANSI S1.4a, Specifications for Sound Level
Meters, Type 2 requirements. Sound pressure levels throughout the protected area shall be
measured to confirm that they are in compliance with NFPA 101 Chapter 18. The sound level
meter shall be set in accordance with ANSI S3.41, American National Standard Audible
Evacuation Signal, using the time weighted characteristic F (FAST).

Transmission of Signals
The universal digital alarm communicator transmitter (UDACT) is designed for use on the Notifier
NFS-320, NFS2- 640, NFS2-3030, NFS-640 and NFS-3030 fire alarm control panels and on the
NCA-2 and the network control annunciator (NCA).

The UDACT transmits system status to UL listed central station receivers via the public switched
telephone network. The UDACT is compact in size and may be mounted externally in a separate
cabinet.

The UDACT can transmit the status of software zones (alarm and trouble), system trouble, panel
off-normal, supervisory, bell trouble, low battery, and AC fail. The UDACT can transmit all of the
zone and point statuses associated with each panel. When the UDACT is used with the NFS3030, NFS2-3030, and NCA-2 it can report up to 2,040 points.
Reporting may be in the form of points or zones. The first 568 points transmitted may be
programmed for a variety of types, including fire, waterflow, supervisory, etc. Remaining points
transmitted are for fire alarm only.
The FireWatch series internet monitoring modules IPDACT-2 and IPDACT-2UD available for
this unit though not employed, permit monitoring of alarm signals over the Internet, saving the
monthly cost of two dedicated business telephone lines. Although not required, the secondary
telephone line may be retained providing backup communication over the public switched
telephone line.
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Door Hold-Open Devices
Every self-closing, fire rated, cross-corridor door on each floor incorporates magnetic hold-open
devices (6 on each floor). Occupants pass through these doors repeatedly throughout the day.
The frequency of opening and closing them repeatedly would be irritating, in particularly to staff.
The purpose of door hold-open device is to hold a door in the open position under normal
operating conditions and disabling the self-closing feature of the door in a controlled means.
Without the hold-open devices, inevitably, someone would wedge the door(s) open. This act of
negligence would cause delay in closing the door during a fire enabling toxic products of
combustion to spread freely uncontained.
A smoke detector, power supply, hold open device, and a trigger mechanism are components
of the hold-open system of each door. Each system is controlled by a NC-100R addressable
relay module connected to the FACP, signal line circuit (SLC). This facility uses hold-open
magnets on the doors with magnetic counter plates mounted to the corridor wall.
Upon any FACP alarm signal initiation (manual fire alarm initiation, automatic detection,
extinguishing systems operation), the magnetic hold open devices are activated (released) and
the automatic door closers do their job. Loss of power will similarly release the hold-open devices
as well as, the devices can be manually released at any time by the use of a manual release
button nearby or giving a good tug on the door to break the magnetic connection. All hold-open
devices successfully in this building passed final inspection.

Mass Notification System
The NFS2-3030 has an option and capacity for an add-on mass notification system, however,
was not selected for this project. The facility uses the telephone public announcement system
to broadcast emergency conditions to staff throughout the facility. Mass notification systems,
when employed, shall follow the prescriptions of 2010- NFPA 72 Chapter 24. The intelligibility of
the employed telephone public announcement system is mediocre and certainly does not meet
requirements of NFPA 72 Chapter 24 or would it be considered reliable in the event of a fire.
Upon alarm activation, the staff are trained in and use portable two-way radios for
communications.
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Intelligibility
Intelligibility is defined by NFPA 72 as the quality or condition of being intelligible. The term
intelligibility relates to voice communications used in emergency communications systems. If
voice messages to occupants in buildings and other locations cannot be understood, the
message system will have little, if any, benefit. Requirements for voice messages to be
intelligible are not new to the code, however, with the expansion of requirements for emergency
communications systems, intelligible voice communications have become even more important.

Requirements for voice intelligibility, contained in NFPA 72 section 18.4.10, have been updated
in this edition of the prescriptive code and are referenced from Chapter 24. New Annex D,
speech intelligibility, provides guidance on system design with emphasis on testing.

Intelligible is defined by NFPA 72 as capable of being understood; comprehensible; clear. The
term intelligible is intended to address only the communications channel and the acoustic
environment. Intelligibility assumes that the talker or recorded voice message is in a language
and using words known to the listener. It also assumes that the listener has normal hearing.

Inspection, Testing and Maintenance
To ensure operational integrity, the system shall have an inspection, testing, and maintenance
(ITM) program. The inspection, testing, and maintenance of systems, their initiating devices, and
notification appliances shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 14 of the 2010 edition
NFPA 72. Chapter 14 covers the minimum requirements for inspection, testing, and
maintenance of fire alarm systems; supervising station alarm systems; public emergency alarm
reporting systems; emergency communications systems (ECSs); single and multiple-station
smoke and heat alarms; and household fire alarm systems. Chapter 14 includes requirements
for visual inspection and inspection frequencies, testing and test methods, testing frequencies,
maintenance requirements, and record keeping.
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As part of the final acceptance test or modification reacceptance testing, system documents are
prepared by the installing contractor and given to the facility for future inspection testing and
maintenance. These documents include fire alarm system record of completion, point-to-point
wiring diagrams, individual device interconnection drawings, as-built drawings, original
equipment specification sheets, operator manuals, manufacturers proper testing and
maintenance requirements, and device address/location list.

The acceptance testing requirements for a fire alarm system are specified in NFPA 72 section
14.4. A summary includes subject areas including control equipment, engine driven generator,
secondary (standby) power supply, uninterrupted power supplies, batteries, public emergency
alarm reporting system power supply, public emergency alarm reporting system transmission
equipment, transient suppressors, fire alarm control unit trouble signals, remote annunciators,
metallic and nonmetallic conductors, initiating devices, exit markings, audible notification
appliances, special hazard equipment, supervising station alarm systems, transmission
equipment, supervising station alarm systems, receiving equipment, and emergency
communications. Testing frequencies of fire alarm components are specified in NFPA 72 section
14.5 and include monthly, quarterly, semiannual, and annual frequencies depending upon the
component to ensure reliability of the system.

Conclusion
The fire alarm system in this facility far and above exceeds the fire alarm prescriptions of a
normal healthcare facility. Due to the roof noncompliance, additional time and expense was
necessary to get maximum points on the FSES which allowed CMS to approve a waiver for
participation in federal funding.

To repair the mistake would have cost upwards of $1 million and additional financial hardship to
the facility. A total (complete) fire alarm system for total zone detection CMS required, in addition
to, intumescent coating applied to the underside of the combustible roof decking and a quick
response, dry-pipe sprinkler system in the attic. CMS felt the additional smoke detection
provided a level of safety for the occupant’s that was equivalent to constructing the roof decking
in one-hour rated construction.
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During review of available fire alarm documents, observation revealed the sequence of
operations matrix, shown in Figure 18, that summarizes the cause-and-effect actions of the fire
alarm system is missing magnetic door hold open devices that release during alarm conditions,
heat detectors, and the kitchen hood suppression system.

The following section depicts an analysis on the water supply and the suppression system.
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Suppression System Analysis
Introduction
This facility has two water-based fire suppression systems protecting occupants and assets in
the building. A wet pipe system installed in the climate controlled first and second floors of the
facility and a dry pipe system in the unconditioned attic space of the facility. The base of riser,
backflow preventor, control valves, and riser assemblies for both systems are shown in Figure
33. Both systems are in the 1st-floor main mechanical room. The fire department connection
(FDC) is located on the northside of the building, a few feet west of the main entrance. There
are two hydrants on the North side of the building, one located at the Northeast entrance, the
other approximately 150 feet West of the main entrance on the opposite side of the street. The
designated fire department access to the FDC is 30-feet wide.

Both suppression systems that protect this light hazard healthcare facility employ quick response
sprinkler heads. Sprinklers in the attic are 200-degree listed heads having green glass bulbs.
The remainder of the facility are 155-degree listed heads having red glass bulbs. The most
demanding design area is the attic system requiring approximately 404 gallons per minute
(GPM) at 43 pounds per square inch (psi) pressure from the city connection. The city connection
provides 68 psi static pressure with 650 GPM flowing at 38 psi residual pressure.

FIGURE 33 - WET AND DRY PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS.
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Design Criteria and Hydraulic Calculations
Design criteria of this sprinkler system is based on the use group being an I-2, Institutional.
The NFPA 101 construction type is Type II (111) construction and is a light hazard
healthcare facility. The sprinkler head density is 0.10 GPM /ft2 for each design area. The hose
stream allowance (HSA) and duration requirement of each hydraulically calculated system is
100 GPM for 30 minutes.

The area of operation for design area #1, shown in Figure 34, is 900 square feet (40% area
reduction utilizing quick response sprinkler heads with less than 20-foot ceiling heights) with a
minimum of five sprinkler heads in the design area are used. The demand from design area #1
using computer calculation is 236.95 GPM at 50.23 psi and includes 100 GPM HSA.

The demand from design area #2 in the attic, shown in Figure 35, is the most remote and
demanding of the two design areas. Using 1,500 square feet, adding 30% for dry pipe system
and adding 30% for sloped area is 2,535 square feet; using computer calculation, the demand
was 404.35 GPM at 42.67 psi and included 100 GPM HAS. Hand calculations revealed the
demand was 404.53 GPM at 46.06 psi and included 100 GPM HSA.

Since design area #2 is the most demanding of the design areas, for purposes of this report,
only system #2 hydraulic hand calculations were performed. In comparison, the water demand
in GPM was nearly identical to that generated by computer varying by 0.18 GPM. The pressure
hand calculation in comparison to that generated by computer varied by 5.7psi. Furthermore,
the minimum operating pressure of any sprinkler head is 7 psi, hand calculations indicated
slightly less than that required by code. Hydraulic design computer and hand calculations are
provided in supplement to this report in Appendix B.
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FIGURE 34 - DESIGN AREA #1, 2ND FLOOR.
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FIGURE 35 - DESIGN AREA #2, ATTIC.
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Water Supply Analysis
The computer-generated demand of the suppression system for design area #2 (attic system)
is 304.35 GPM at 42.67psi. Adding in 100 GPM HSA, the demand is 404.35 GPM at 42.67psi.
A safety margin of 11.202psi, design area #2 demand becomes 53.87psi. The hydraulically
calculated system nameplate for design area #2 indicates the system is designed to discharge
at a rate of 0.10 GPM per ft2 of floor area over a maximum area of 2,535 ft 2 when supplied with
a water flowing at 461.1 GPM at 43.8 psi at the base of the riser, which includes HSA of 100
GPM.
Hand calculations using the Hazen-Williams method reveal a water demand of 404.53 GPM
(includes 100 GPM HSA) at 53.28 psi. The city static pressure of 68 psi, residual pressure of 34
psi flowing 653 GPM is sufficient pressure and GPM for the most demanding area of the system,
when evaluated at system demand. 11.202 extra pressure is available, defined as safety margin
on the water supply curve. No fire pump is necessary in this design, as the demand was met
from the connection shown in Figure 36 at the time of design. As shown in Figure 37, at 20 psi,
the hydrant flow test of 2,008 GPM was available at the road.

FIGURE 36 - ATTIC SPRINKLER SYSTEM WATER SUPPLY CURVE ON 2/16/2015.
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FIGURE 37 –FIRE HYDRANT FLOW TEST REPORT ON 11/14/2012.

Sprinkler System Piping and Sprinkler Head Detail
The water-based suppression system is fed from an 8-inch underground pipe tapered into a 6inch underground, city looped system as shown in Figure 38. At the base of the riser located in
the ground floor mechanical room, the 8-inch underground supply line is reduced to a 4-inch
riser assembly for both wet and dry systems. 2-inch and larger piping for all mains on this project
is schedule 10 grooved piping; smaller than 2-inch branch lines are threaded schedule 40 pipe.
From the base of the riser, 4-inch pipe is used to feed the 2.5-inch, 2.25-inch, and 2-inch mains.
1.5-inch and 1-inch pipe is used for the branch lines. The riser detail is shown in Figure 39.
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FIGURE 38 - UNDERGROUND WATERSUPPLY PIPING DIAGRAM.

FIGURE 39 - SPRINKLER SYSTEM RISER DETAIL.

Copyright © 2021 by Edward Hale, All Rights Reserved.

Page 79 of 263

There are 813 sprinkler heads protecting this building as shown in the sprinkler head legends in
Figure 40, Figure 41, and Figure 42 for the 1st-floor, 2nd-floor, and attic respectively.

FIGURE 40 - SPRINKLER HEAD LEGEND, 1ST FLOOR.

FIGURE 41 - SPRINKLER HEAD LEGEND, 2ND FLOOR.

FIGURE 42 - SPRINKLER HEAD LEGEND, ATTIC.
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Piping Support
The sprinkler pipe hanger spacing referenced in Figure 43 hanger detail specifies the maximum
distance of steel pipe to be hung. Hanger spacing of 12 to 15 feet depending upon diameter of
the pipe is prescribed by NFPA 13. The dry pipe system piping, also steel, is sloped for drainage
between ¼ inch and ½ inch every 10 feet depending upon size of pipe.

FIGURE 43 - SPRINKLER PIPE HANGER DETAIL.

Copyright © 2021 by Edward Hale, All Rights Reserved.

Page 81 of 263

Inspection, Testing and Maintenance
After commissioning and final approval of the sprinkler systems, the sprinkler system’s
inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) requirements are the responsibility of the property
owner or their authorized representative and are to be in accordance with 2011 edition, NFPA
25 Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection
Systems to provide at least the same level of performance and protection as designed, installed,
and approved.

Chapter 5 of this standard, Table 5.1.1.2 shown in Figure 44, summarizes sprinkler system
components and frequencies of inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements. Chapter 6
of this standard, Table 6.1.1.2 summarizes private fire service main components and
frequencies of inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements. Chapter 13 of this standard,
Table 13.1.1.2 shown in Figure 45 and Figure 46, summarizes valve, valve components and trim
components and frequencies of inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements. Chapter 13
also includes ITM of backflow prevention assemblies. There is no standpipe, fire pump or water
tank components in this suppression system.
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FIGURE 44 - SUMMARY OF SPRINKLER SYSTEM INSPECTION, TESTING, AND MAINTENANCE.
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FIGURE 45 - VALVE & COMPONENT ITM SUMMARY.
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FIGURE 46 - VALVE & COMPONENT ITM SUMMARY.
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Other Sprinkler System Components
As previously covered in the alarm section, the sprinkler system has a vane type water flow
switch as shown in Figure 29, to monitor water flow in the sprinkler system. The dry pipe sprinkler
system contains two pressure switches, an alarm pressure switch and a supervisory low/high air
pressure switch shown in Figure 30. Both switches monitor the air pressure on the system side
of the dry pipe valve.
They perform the following two functions: a supervisory switch monitors low and high air
pressure and prevents the accidental operation of the dry pipe valve due to low air pressure from
an air compressor failure or other leaks in the system. This same supervisory switch also
monitors high air pressure to prevent damage to the clapper and rubber gaskets in the dry pipe
valve. High pressure can also damage the pipe. If air pressure is too high, the valve won’t
operate until it bleeds off the extra system air causing a delay of the dry pipe valve opening.
There were no sprinkler system water curtains protecting any exterior openings noted.

Conclusion
The water-based fire protection system initially met the prescriptions required for this healthcare
facility. Due to the non-compliant roof resulting in combustible materials in the attic space, a
quick response, dry-pipe sprinkler system was added for attic protection. The intumescent paint
sprayed on the underside of the roof deck did not provide a level of protection equal to or
exceeding the intent of the code for a one-hour rating as previously discussed. Fortunately, the
water supply availability from the original inquiry was sufficient to accommodate the attic
sprinkler system demand without the need for a costly fire pump.
A concerning factor of the suppression system analysis was significant time had passed between
the original water supply hydrant flow test data (done 11/14/2012) and the design and installation
of the attic sprinkler system (2015). An updated hydrant flow test should have been conducted to
ensure water pressure and volume continued to meet the water supply the system demanded.
Other projects in the area may have changed the water supply availability. Both sprinkler
systems successfully passed final inspection and testing. The following section will present an
analysis on the smoke control features of the building.
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Smoke Control Analysis
Introduction
Smoke control measures for any building is essential component to survivability during a fire. A
more detailed analysis of smoke is covered in an upcoming section under tenability. Smoke
inhalation is the leading cause of death in a fire. Smoke can inhibit evacuation, impair wayfinding,
and reduce movement speed, resulting in prolonged evacuation and additional exposure to heat
and toxic gases. This building is occupied by mostly mobility impaired occupants with minimal
staff to aid in rescue. The materials making up the construction materials and furnishings today
are far more toxic when burned than those made just a few decades ago. This facility has no
designated mechanical smoke extraction system, and it is not required by any prescriptive code.
The building does provide other effective smoke control measures to assist in controlling the
spread of smoke and fire and include HVAC system shutdown, compartmentalization, and
isolation of fire by staff.

Heating, Ventilation, Air-Conditioning (HVAC)
Referenced by NFPA 101, NFPA 90A entitled Standard for the Installation of Air-Conditioning
and Ventilating Systems, section 6.4 prescribes smoke detectors listed for use in air distribution
systems to be located as follows:
1. Downstream of the air filters and ahead of any branch connections in air supply systems
having a capacity greater than 944 L/sec (2000 cfm)
2. At each story prior to the connection to a common return and prior to any recirculation or
fresh air inlet connection in air return systems having a capacity greater than 7080 L/sec
(15,000 cfm) and serving more than one story.
Return system smoke detectors are not required where the entire space served by the air
distribution system is protected by a system of area smoke detectors, or for fan units whose sole
function is to remove air from the inside of the building to the outside of the building. Where
provided, duct smoke detectors are required to be provided with a remote test station. Duct
smoke detectors are required to automatically stop their respective fan(s) upon detecting the

Copyright © 2021 by Edward Hale, All Rights Reserved.

Page 87 of 263

presence of smoke. This facility employs 24 Honeywell InnovairFlex® DNR(A) duct smoke
detectors, shown in Figure 24. This is an intelligent non-relay photoelectric duct smoke detector.
When smoke is detected, the applicable HVAC system is shut down to minimize the spread of
smoke and a supervisory alert is reported at the FACP.

Containment
Smoke travels in the path of least resistance, is lighter than air, and full of lethal components
that hinder seeing and breathing capabilities in a fire. Firestopping denies the passage of flame
and products of combustion and maintains the continuity of fire-resistance in a rated wall, floor,
or floor/ceiling assembly from building service equipment penetrations and breaches. Throughpenetration firestops, membrane penetration firestops, fire-resistive joint systems, and perimeter
fire barrier systems are the primary firestop system categories used to control fire and smoke
traveling through the rated barriers within this building. Properly installed and maintained,
firestopping systems allow additional time for occupant evacuation during in a fire event. This
passive fire protection component is essential in healthcare facilities having many mobility
impaired occupants. Maintenance is often overlooked, and quite frequently, firestop systems are
installed incorrectly to begin with due to lack of firestopping knowledge and experience.
Such an important element, IBC section 1705 of the 2012 and later editions require special
inspection of firestop systems, fire-resistant joint systems and perimeter fire containment
systems installed in high-rise buildings or in buildings assigned to risk category III or IV in
accordance with IBC 1604.5 to ensure proper installation and maintenance. Risk category III
includes most healthcare facilities. NFPA 101 also requires firestopping.
The smoke compartments shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 have red lines indicating the location
of the fire rated separation walls making up the three smoke compartments on each floor and is
where firestopping is mostly applicable. These walls built from floor to ceiling, were constructed
to UL U419 and are made up of 4-3/8” metal studs spaced 16” on center, with glass fiber
insulation filling the stud cavities and is covered with one layer of ½” gypsum wall board per side
to achieve a minimum one-hour fire resistance rating as prescribed by NFPA 101 section
18.3.7.3. The heavy black lines represent two-hour rated walls /door assembly of the existing
facility.
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The fire rated wall, floor, or floor/ceiling assemblies may include fire or smoke rated dampers
and door assemblies. Referenced by NFPA 101, rated doors and dampers are required to be
inspected, tested, and maintained to NFPA 80, entitled Standard for Fire Doors and Other
Opening Protectives. In all CMS funded healthcare facilities effective January 1, 2018, all fire
rated door assemblies in rated walls are required to have ITM annually. Damper ITM is required
every four years, six years in hospitals.

Isolation of Fire - Staff Training
The facility fire safety management plan, example shown as Appendix C in this report, requires
all staff on every shift to be very familiar with the expected response to fire emergencies and
practice simulated fire drills monthly. A key component in smoke control and fire spread, is
isolation of fire. In response to a fire, staff learn to use the acronym TRACE to help remember
the basic response to a fire event. The C, in TRACE, means CONTAIN FIRE. Close all doors to
the fire area to prevent the spread of fire and smoke. Close all remaining doors in the smoke
compartment to prevent spread of fire and smoke to non-involved areas.

Conclusion
Smoke control is essential to tenability in a fire. In a facility with 90% mobility impaired occupants
and a resident to staff ratio of >10 to 1 respectively, inspection, testing, and maintenance of all
smoke control systems are an absolute necessity.

The HVAC system smoke detectors are serviced during the annual fire alarm ITM. As with the
other smoke detectors throughout the building, the FACP continuously monitors every smoke
detector’s sensitivity. The inspection of fire and smoke rated wall, floor, or floor/ceiling assembly
firestopping is annually. Has been my experience following initial firestopping inspections, low
voltage internet/cable/satellite workers are notorious for leaving behind large, unsealed holes in
a rated assembly. Often unknowingly, the work done must be thoroughly inspected prior to
workers departure to ensure accountability and to identify any areas needing to be firestopped.
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Many of the rated walls within the building have fire door assemblies. The doors are held open
by magnets to aid staff and other occupants in the day-to-day tasks. The sequence of operations
matrix, shown in Figure 18, did not reflect the 12 magnetic door hold-open devices (six on each
floor) located on the cross-corridor, double doors in the fire / smoke barrier walls of each smoke
compartment. The door magnets are controlled through a NC-100R addressable relay module
connected to the FACP signal line circuit (SLC). When the FACP receives an alarm signal
(manual fire alarm initiation, automatic detection, extinguishing system operation), within ten
seconds, the FACP signals the module and the magnetic door hold open devices lose the
capability of holding the applicable self-closing doors open. The door maybe already closed or
obstructed from closing fully. The staff is trained to maintain these doors free from obstructions
and verify these doors close tight upon hearing or seeing the fire alarm system activated.
Rated door assemblies ITM is required annually.

Isolating the fire to the room of origin after rescuing any occupants is a leading contributor to a
favorable outcome in a fire. Closing all doors to the fire area to prevent the spread of fire and
smoke, as well as, closing all remaining doors in the smoke compartment to further prevent
spread of fire and smoke is an essential response by staff. Failure to do this can be detrimental.
Thankfully, required monthly fire drill training of all staff on every shift helps keep staff response
sharp and on point in the event of a real fire. The following section will introduce the performancebased analysis of this report.
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PERFORMANCE-BASED ANALYSIS
Introduction
Performance-based approach in design and assessment of a building’s safety features is a
process of developing an equivalent means of protection to meet or exceed prescriptive-based
requirements. In cases where no prescriptive codes are applicable, the fire protection engineer
can provide solutions to fire and life safety interests that meet or exceed the intent of prescriptive
codes and are deemed acceptable by all stakeholders.

In this performance-based design section, the goal sought after is preserving life safety and to
provide insight to increase the survivability of mobility impaired occupants during a fire. The
objectives being pursued to accomplish this the goal are to evaluate rescue and evacuation
practices of the staff when evacuating mobility impaired occupants and the effectiveness of fire
and smoke containment measures integrated into the building.

A computer simulated fire in an occupant room near a primary exit will be constructed like that
in ASTM E 2280-13 entitled Standard Guide for Fire Hazard Assessment of the Effect of
Upholstered Seating Furniture Within Patient Rooms of Healthcare Facilities (provided in
Appendix E). The simulation data will be used to evaluate the objectives to determine if the
design goal is effective and what, if any, recommendations are suggested to achieve the goal.
Flammability assessment of interior furnishing will be presented. Tenability criteria to evaluate
the Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) vs. the Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) will be
evaluated. The design fire assumptions, design components and results of simulation will be
presented. The following section will introduce the rescue procedures of staff.
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Rescue Procedures of Staff
The staff emergency procedures specified in a fire safety management plan (provided in
Appendix C) include procedures that include rescue operations in the event of a fire. These
procedures are conducted at least once monthly by each staff member on every shift.

The acronym T-R-A-C-E is used to assist staff in remembering initial procedures to be
implemented during a fire and is specified as follows:

Use of Code Phrase
TELL SOMEONE – CODE RED
The discoverer of any smoke or fire shall immediately announce “CODE RED” at the top of your
voice with the exact fire location, three times, gaining the attention of nearby coworkers and
other occupants.

Evacuation of Immediate Area
RESCUE – Immediate area
When a person is involved in the fire area, the discoverer should immediately go to the aid of
the person(s) involved, if safe to do so, and remove all persons directly within the immediate
area of the fire while also calling aloud CODE RED with the exact fire location.

IF readily available, the discoverer can take a portable fire extinguisher into the immediate area
to aid in rescue. Relocate the person(s) involved in the fire area to a designated safe area. Close
the door to the fire area to contain the fire. The opposite side of the fire doors of the adjoining
smoke compartment is a safe area of refuge. Residents restricted to a bed shall be removed
utilizing emergency evacuation procedures such as the blanket drag, or two-person carry.
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Use of Alarms
ACTIVATE ALARM
If the fire alarm system has not been activated after the rescue of all endangered persons, locate
the nearest fire alarm manual pull station to manually activate the fire alarm to summon
assistance. The red colored fire alarm manual pull stations are located at every emergency exit
in the building, at each cross-corridor doors, and at the top and bottom of the stairwells. To
activate the fire alarm manual pull station, push in, and pull down on the pull station lever to
activate the alarm. There will be a few seconds delay before the horn/strobes will activate.

Upon activation of the fire alarm, all fire doors using a magnetic hold open device will self-close,
the 1st-floor charge nurse shall designate staff to each 1st-floor exit door to monitor occupant
traffic. The charge nurse will advise the fire department of incident status upon their arrival.

During a fire alarm activation, no persons shall enter the building except on duty
employees and public safety personnel, NO EXCEPTIONS!

Upon hearing and seeing the fire alarm activated, all attendants protecting the doors to the
exterior of the building shall promptly obtain a portable radio, turn on full volume and quickly
locate to your assigned exit, and wait further instructions from Charge Nurse / Incident
Commander.

Isolation of Fire
CONTAIN FIRE
Close all doors to the fire area to prevent the spread of fire and smoke. After clearing the area
or room for occupants, close all applicable doors in the smoke compartment to prevent spread
of fire and smoke. Turn on lights if dark and safe to do so. All magnetic door holders at the fire
rated walls will automatically release upon activation of the fire alarm system. When instructed
by the charge nurse/incident commander, shut off the zone oxygen valve to the fire area. If a
resident is on oxygen, take portable oxygen cart from supply room for use.
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Extinguish / Evacuation
EXTINGUISH FIRE / EVACTUATE SMOKE COMPARTMENT
Extinguisher
Available personnel who have been properly trained in the safe use and operation of portable
fire extinguishers are permitted to try and extinguish the fire IF: is reasonably safe to do so; to
aide in rescue of anyone in immediate harm; the fire sprinkler system is not spraying water.

Remember P.A.S.S.
1234-

Pull, Aim, Squeeze and Sweep to use fire extinguisher.

P – Pull the pin
A – Aim the extinguisher at the base of the fire
S – Squeeze the handle
S – Sweep side to side

Evacuate
All occupants from the smoke compartment involved with fire.

All available personnel are to report to fire area to assist in removing residents in immediate
danger, clearing obstructions within the corridors, if any, and removal of all remaining occupants
through the fire doors in the adjoining smoke compartment.

Close resident doors as you evacuate each room and mark all evacuated rooms with the allclear tag on the closed door. If a fire is reported on the 1st-floor, the 2nd-floor charge nurse shall
direct staff for resident evacuation of the smoke compartment above the reported fire location.

Charge Nurse / Incident Commander
1- CNIC or designee shall overhead page “CODE RED” and the exact location.
2- CNIC or designee shall call fire department / 9-1-1.
[Provide as many relevant details on the fire emergency as possible, including fire
location, sprinkler system activation, any injuries, evacuation status, any unaccounted
occupants, etcetera. Stay on the phone with 9-1-1 until fire department arrives.]

3- CHIC or designee shall begin to prepare for a Full Building Evacuation
[Quick Ref: Full Building Evacuation Procedure - Tab 7, Page 11 of Emergency Plans Book]
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Transmission of Fire Alarm to Fire Department
Upon activation of the fire alarm system, the automatic dialer within the fire alarm panel will call
and notify the UL Listed alarm monitoring company who will in turn notify the fire department /
9-1-1 Emergency Dispatch. The charge nurse or designee shall also call the Fire Dept. / 9-1-1
providing as much detail on the incident as possible. Caller shall stay on the phone with dispatch
until the fire department arrives.

IF YOU HEAR THE FIRE ALARM AND FIRE IS NOT IN YOUR AREA
1- Listen closely for an overhead page of the fire location.
2- If overhead page is not heard yet, check the fire alarm panel located at the 2nd floor charge
nurse station or at the 1st-floor North entrance welcome desk for device activation location.
DO NOT SILENCE THE FIRE ALARM!
3- Overhead page “CODE RED” and location if not heard yet.
4- All available personnel report to assist evacuation in fire area.
Never leave patient areas unattended.
5- A supervisor/Charge Nurse shall report to 1st-floor North entrance Fire Alarm Control Panel
in the event of additional emergencies and to direct operations and assist the fire department.
6- Upon activation of the fire alarm, all fire doors will close. The 1st-floor charge nurse shall
designate staff to each 1st-floor exit door to monitor occupant traffic and advise fire
department upon arrival. All door attendants shall promptly obtain a portable radio, turn on
and to high volume and quickly locate to assigned exit, waiting further instructions from
Charge Nurse / Incident Commander.

During a fire alarm activation, no persons shall enter the building, except on duty
employees and public safety personnel, NO EXCEPTIONS!!
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A well-rehearsed fire safety plan, with frequent and professional inspection, testing, and
maintenance of the key life safety systems (detection, suppression, and containment) are the
essential components to a favorable outcome during a fire in this multistory healthcare facility.
Fire simulation drills will be performed at least once monthly on each shift at varying times. All
staff must participate. All staff must sign drill log during post event critique that will be performed
following each fire drill to find weaknesses and improve staff performance. The following section
will introduce Occupant Characteristics.

Occupant Characteristics
Occupants of this facility include staff, volunteers, up to 78 residents and resident families. 90%
of the residents are mobility impaired and use a wheelchair for means of transportation
throughout the facility. The average age of the residents is over 65. On average, one staff
member is responsible for ten or more residents and their families at any given time.
In 2013 joint study by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Oklahoma
State University (OSU) entitled Stair Evacuation of Older Adults and People with Mobility
Impairments observed egress speeds ranging between 0.07 to 0.54 meter per second (m/s). A
2020 study entitled Investigating Evacuation Behaviour in Retirement Facilities: Case Studies
from New Zealand observed horizontal walking speeds of 0.3 m/s to 0.73 m/s (0.98 ft/s to 2.4
ft/s) when using walking aids and 0.37 m/s to 1.55 m/s (1.2 ft/s to 5.09 ft/s) when not using
walking aides in uncongested situations. The study compared those found in the SFPE
handbook and noted that most data points were below the SFPE design curve. The study
advised the reader to be aware that the SFPE data is often used for the design of buildings
having mostly adults without mobility impairments and may not be appropriate for healthcare
facility egress design.
Applying the data from the 2020 study, in 195 feet (59.436 m) maximum travel distance to a safe
smoke barrier egress in this building could take between 0.96 minutes to 3.32 minutes for that
occupant using walking aids. This calculation does not consider several factors such as time of
day, activity being performed at time of event, occupant premovement time, or facility staff /public
safety intervention in evacuation.
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This is facility being a healthcare facility, the resident pre-movement time could be several
minutes especially during sleeping hours, additionally, staff is responsible to confirm is an actual
fire exists before any evacuation message is conveyed to begin, this process alone could take
several minutes. A few factors influencing evacuation times are detection, validation, definition,
evaluation, commitment, reassessment, low staff-to-patient ratio, staff fatigue, and obstructed
egress. Resident pre-movement times indicated in the 2020 study ranged from 10-seconds to
219-seconds with 75th percentile at 116-seconds. The study indicated a cumulative probability
distribution of their data had shown about 96% would most likely be 168-seconds or less.

Using the travel times reported by the NIST/OSU study and applying to horizontal egress (0.07
to 0.54 m/s and 1.19 m/s for staff) compartment evacuation times for 20 persons (18 residents,
2 staff), assuming all residents are in the center of their rooms and the staff are at the nurse
station, self-evacuation in the subject smoke compartment could take an astonishing 123.4minutes.
An event unfolding during sleep time in a healthcare facility, staff to resident ratio could be as
high as 1 to 20 respectively. Premovement time for staff could be immediate to a few minutes.
Getting the mobility impaired, sleeping senior occupants pre-moving toward safety during sleep
time will easily take several minutes. The following section will introduce tenability
considerations.

Tenability
Tenability as defined by SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire, 2nd edition, (a valuable resource
for this study) as environmental conditions in which smoke and heat are at sufficiently low levels
that the impact on occupants is not incapacitating or life-threatening.

Building and fire codes prescribe a minimum level of safety through general requirements. Such
example is in a sprinklered I-2 healthcare building, the IBC section 407.5.2 and NFPA 101
section 18.3.7.1(4) both require the distance of travel from any point in a smoke compartment to
a smoke barrier door be not greater than 200 feet.
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Sprinkler systems in light hazard healthcare facilities are designed primarily to control the spread
of a fire, not to extinguish the fire. In some cases, the sprinkler system will extinguish the fire.
For purposes of this study, an unsuppressed fire will be evaluated.

In an unsuppressed fire, conditions can become deadly quickly. Products of combustion and
heat increase exponentially as the fire grows. When occupants are not capable of selfpreservation or are unfamiliar with the building, the occupants are fully dependent upon staff for
their well-being, including emergency evacuation when necessary. Impaired vision from smoke,
asphyxiation from toxins, thermal effects from radiant and convective heat, and falling or airborne
materials or a combination thereof, can quickly lead to incapacitation or worse, be lethal.

Performance design criteria of the occupant characteristics in this building falls under NFPA 101
section 5.4.5 and in part, states, “shall provide an accurate reflection of the expected population
of the building users”. This section will explore a reflection of the population in this building and
if the maximum 200 feet travel allowance is an accurate reflection to maintain tenable conditions
during a fire with the staff to resident ratio as it is reported.
In the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering- 5th Edition, there are chapters that
discuss design processes for establishing tenability limits. Chapter 50 (page 1785) entitled
Smoke Control by John Klote is very informative on tenability, as well as Chapter 63 (page 2308)
entitled Assessment of Hazards to Occupants from Smoke, Toxic Gases, and Heat by David
Purser and Jamie McAllister.

Many studies validate the vast majority of fire deaths are attributable to carbon monoxide
poisoning and majority of fire deaths are remote from the fire room in fires that have proceeded
past flashover. In most situations, FED values of 0.8 are used for a non-lethal exposure, an FED
value of 0.3 are used for a non-incapacitating exposure. A value of 1.0 is considered
incapacitation. In buildings where occupants are especially vulnerable, the FED values should
be modified to lower values than 0.8 or 0.3, such as 0.5 and 0.1 respectively.
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A complete analysis of tenability described by SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire, 2 nd
edition, requires consideration of tenability criteria of the thermal effects (convective heat and
radiant heat) and smoke obscuration, as well as those for smoke exposure.

Thermal Effects
Burns to the body or respiratory tract can cause incapacitation and/or death. Hyperthermia is
commonly caused from prolonged exposure to thermal effects of a fire. 15-minutes or more
exposure to less than 248 degrees Fahrenheit in dry air, and 176 degrees Fahrenheit in
saturated air (sprinkler head activation), the main effect was increase in body core temperature
(normally 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit). When the bodies core temperature reaches 104 degrees
Fahrenheit, consciousness becomes blurred, and person can become ill. Over 108.5 degrees
Fahrenheit, irreversible damage can result if not treated promptly.
In water-vapor saturated air (steam) at around 212 degrees Fahrenheit, it can cause thermal
damage to the entire respiratory tract. 140 degrees Fahrenheit in 100% water-vapor saturated
air (highest temperature found) can be breathed and tolerated. Burn to the skin above 112
degrees Fahrenheit is painful and can lead to incapacitation, sever injury or death depending
upon severity. Thermal effects causing incapacitation or death of occupants is most probable in
the immediate area of the fire. For purposes of this performance-based design, it is assumed
thermal effects will not impair the tenability conditions of the occupants.
Smoke Obscuration
Several researchers have provided many suggestions for visibility limits. 4 feet to 65 feet have
been proclaimed depending upon exit signage, lighting, irritant and nonirritant smoke, and
familiarity with the locations of egress. Reduced visibility causes reduced movement speed and
more exposure to heat and toxicants. Visibility must be treated differently than toxicity levels and
heated smoke. No certainty proclaims occupants could or could not escape through poor
visibility in smoke.
SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire, 2nd edition resources referenced at 1.6 feet visibility or
obstruction, the escape will slow sufficiently, and toxic gases or heat exposure can result in
incapacitation. Smoke obscuration can inhibit evacuation, impair wayfinding, and reduce
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movement speed, resulting in prolonged evacuation and additional exposure to heat and toxic
gases. Obscuration of any value in visibility does not cause incapacitation. Incapacitated occurs
when heat and or toxic gas tenability criteria has been exceeded. For purposes of this
performance-based design, a 2-meter visibility will be used due to the familiarity of staff with the
means of egress, abundant egress signage and all facility lighting on emergency generator.

Smoke Exposure
SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire, 2nd edition identifies asphyxiant gases, primarily carbon
monoxide (CO) and hydrogen cyanide (HCN), in the products of combustion can cause central
nervous and cardiovascular system deterioration. CO is present in some concentration of all
fires. HCN is present in nitrogen containing materials burning in a fire. These materials are
common found in our modern fixtures and include wool, nylon, melamine, polyurethane foams,
and polyacryonitriles.
CO combines with hemoglobin in the blood and forms carboxyhemoglobin and can result in
asphyxia. Side effects up to 40% carboxyhemoglobin in the blood include headache, abnormal
vision, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, loss of fine motor skills, death with occupants having a
compromised cardiac function. Occupant incapacitation ranges between 30-50%. Coma and
death are imminent at over 50% concentration.
HCN has acidic properties and causes asphyxia when inhaled. The concentration, in parts per
million (ppm), at or less than 80 ppm, mild hyperventilation occurred; loss of consciousness at
100 ppm for 23 to 30-minute exposure; 200 ppm loss of consciousness at two minutes; 300+
ppm death occurs rapidly. There are exceptions, body size seems to have the greatest influence
regarding HCN absorption.
CO and HCN cause tissue hypoxia though hypoxia can also be caused from low oxygen levels.
Four hypoxic phases categorized by indifference, compensation, manifestation, and critical with
oxygen levels of 14-21%, 12-14%, 10-12%, 8-10%, respectively. Indifference phase, no
noticeable impairments and only slight ventilation and heart rate changes during compensation
phase. Manifestation phase, degradation of higher mental processes and neuromuscular
control, loss of critical judgment and dullness of the senses, increased cardiovascular and
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respirator activity resulted. The critical hypoxic phase (<10% oxygen) is reached, rapid
deterioration in judgment and comprehension occurs and leads to unconsciousness.
Carbon dioxide (CO2), like CO, is also present in a fire. Usually in small concentrations, though
CO2 causes hyperventilation which will increase the intake of CO and HCN, reducing the time
to incapacitation. Irritants from a fire can cause incapacitation during and after a fire. Irritants
primarily cause irritation to the eyes and respiratory tract. Irritants also can cause acute
pulmonary irritant response consisting of edema and inflammation potentially causing death in
6-24 hours after exposure. The effects can cause visual impairment, wayfinding, eye and
respiratory tract pain, and breathing difficulties. Lung edema, inflammation, and pneumonia are
main hazards after exposure that can lead to death.

Table X10.1 from ASTM E 2280, Standard Guide for Fire Hazard Assessment of the Effect of
Upholstered Seating Furniture Within Patient Rooms of Healthcare Facilities, shown in Figure
47, reflects recommended tenability criteria based on several sources where user does not have
additional information to develop specific criteria for the hazard assessment.

FIGURE 47 - RECOMMENDED TENABILITY CRITERIA.
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Defining untenable conditions of a hazard assessment is necessary. Different scenarios could
define the condition differently, such as impairing visibility along egress route to life threatening
conditions to occupants. For this study, an untenable condition is incapacitating to occupants
leading to the failure of safely egressing from the affected smoke compartment.

Egress times to safe harbor will be calculated for all occupants and staff present in the smoke
compartment selected as the origin of fire. The end point is incapacitation or death from
exposure. A common method to obtain this endpoint is by a concept called fractional effective
dose (FED). The following equation shown in Figure 48 from SFPE Guide to Human Behavior
in Fire, 2nd edition can be calculated to sum all the toxicants an occupant is exposed to, sensory
irritants, and thermal effects.

FIGURE 48 - FRACTIONAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUATION.

FED equation can also be applied to sensory irritants and thermal effects. SFPE Guide to Human
Behavior in Fire, 2nd edition developed the concept of fractional irritant concentration (FIC) as
shown in Figure 49. Heat exposure can be calculated by summing the radiant and convective
fractions as shown in equation in Figure 50.

FIGURE 49 - FRACTIONAL IRRITANT CONCENTRATION EQUATION.
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FIGURE 50 - FED - HEAT EXPOSURE EQUATION.

This study will concentrate on the FED criteria necessary for incapacitation and the lethal end
point to evaluate safe egress of the mobility impaired persons and staff. Carbon Monoxide
incapacitation is dependent upon the dose accumulated over time where carboxyhemoglobin
(COHb) concentration is reached, and compensatory mechanisms fail and the occupant
collapses. Figure 51 (SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire, 2nd edition, Table 7.1) suggests a
70kg (154-pounds) human a Ct exposure dose of 30,000 to 35,000 ppm-min for incapacitation
in average healthy human engaged in light-light activity (waking) is a reasonable value for
incapacitation. This suggested value is anticipated as high for occupants with respiratory distress
in non-fire conditions.

FIGURE 51 - EXPOSURE DOSES OF CO AT REST AND LIGHT ACTIVITY.

SFPE Handbook Table 63.9 suggests 60k to 190k ppm-min is fatal. Sensitive occupants, such
as the residents of this facility, and those with adverse health conditions, the exposure dose limit
should be reduced by a factor of three. This suggestion lowers the Ct exposure dose to
11,667ppm-min of CO for the residents. For healthy staff, will consider them performing medium
activity while performing multiple trips for rescue operations, reducing the dose exposure by a
factor of one to 23,333 ppm-min of CO for incapacitation feel is reasonable.

Calculating the exposure dose to staff member #1: 23,333 / 7.52 minutes =3,102 ppm dose
inhaled for incapacitation; Staff #2 23,333 / 7.74 min = 3,015 ppm dose inhaled for incapacitation;
Fire room resident 11,667/ 3.09 minutes from the farthest travel distance = 3,775 ppm dose
inhaled for incapacitation. There are other equations that measure CO concentration to calculate
an incapacitating dose, some more accurate than others.
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The Stewart equation for example, shown in Figure 52 measures (COHb) concentration in the
blood. A value over 1.0 is considered incapacitating. Looking at this equation, 30-40% (COHb)
in the blood is incapacitation in healthy adults. Reducing this factor for elderly by a factor of three
is 10-13.3% for residents.

FIGURE 52 - STEWART EQUATION FOR CO CONCENTRATION.

In this equation, [CO] is the carbon monoxide concentration (ppm v/v 20 _C); V is the volume of
air breathed each minute (L); t is the exposure time (min); D is the exposure dose (percent
COHb) for incapacitation. V and D values are shown in Figure 53.

FIGURE 53 - STEWART EQUATION VALUES OF V AND D.

In the sample case based on time for evacuation, staff # 1 and staff # 2 will be assumed to be
doing medium activity work, residents will also be considered heavy work. Keep in mind, the
residents farthest away from the origin of the fire, closest to the egress will not have this same
value as the example shown for resident traveling 195 feet, the maximum distance of travel in
the smoke compartment.
Staff #1: (3.317*10^-5) * (23,333 ppm^1.036) * (50) * (7.52 min) / 20 = 20.9
Staff # 2: (3.317*10^-5) * (23,333 ppm^1.036) * (50) * (7.74 min) / 20 = 21.5

>1
>1

Resident values are with the assumption they would be walking, and not in a wheelchair, from
the farthest point in the smoke compartment and will be considered heavy work:
Resident: (3.317*10^-5) * (11,667 ppm^1.036) * (50) * (3.09 min) / 20 = 4.2
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Assuming a resident was in a wheelchair performing self-rescue from the farthest point in the
smoke compartment and the activity level categorized as light work:
Resident: (3.317*10^-5) * (11,667 ppm^1.036) * (25) * (3.1 min) / 30 = 1.4

>1

Based on these Stewart calculations with times to safe egress calculated in an upcoming section,
and the values over 1.0 being considered incapacitating, the likely outcome would include
occupant fatalities due to the high carbon monoxide doses. The following section will introduce
safe egress time.

Safe Egress Times
SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire, 2 nd edition defines available safe egress time (ASET)
as time available for an individual occupant to escape or move to a safe location. The calculated
time interval between the time of ignition and the time at which conditions become such that the
occupant is estimated to be incapacitated, i.e., unable to take effective action to escape to a safe
refuge or place of safety.
SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire, 2 nd edition defines required safe egress time (RSET)
as time required for an individual occupant to escape or move to a safe location. The calculated
time interval required for an individual occupant to travel from their location at the time of ignition
to a safe refuge or place of safety. Predicting RSET typically involves estimating the time that it
would take for people to be notified that there might be a fire, the time that people would take for
pre-evacuation activities such as alerting others, checking on others (e.g., family members), etc.
and the time it would take for people to egress to a safe location. During the evacuation, there
may be other behaviors, actions or inactions that extend or reduce the time for escape.
Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) Key Components
◦
◦
◦
◦

Detection Time –
Notification Time –
Pre-evacuation –
Evacuation Time –

Fire alarm system, staff, residents.
Fire alarm system activation.
Time of day, eating, sleeping, showering, activities.
Compartment size, Travel distance to egress,
quantity/location/ width of egress, assisted egress or
self-rescue.
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Detection Time. There are several resources within a building that can detect smoke or fire. A
smoke detector and or occupants would likely be the first asset to detect smoke or fire. The type
of smoke detector, sensitivity of the smoke detector, distance of a fire from a smoke detector,
and air movement near the smoke detector are contributing factors that could delay a smoke
detector response to smoke or fire. The sprinkler head is an unlisted heat detector of sorts. The
quick response sprinkler heads activate relatively quickly to a fire, though water flowing can take
up to 90-seconds before the FACP must receive the water flow signal.
Lastly, humans activating a manual pull station involves travel to the nearest device and pulling
it to activate the alarm. Frequent observation during field inspections frequently reveal manual
pull stations to be obstructed consequently would cause a few second delay in manual activation.
Detection time of a fire or smoke in a building could be a few seconds to several minutes. For
purposes of estimating the RSET, a 4-second detector response time will be used that was
observed from the design fire simulation.
Notification Time. Fire alarm system activation to any alarm signal received has 10-seconds to
process and activate the audible and visual alarm signals. Upon activation of alarm signals, staff
of this facility is required by the facility fire safety plan to verify is an actual fire prior to all staff
responding. This procedure can be prompt or take a few minutes. For purposes of calculating
RSET, 10-seconds for FACP alarm signal processing and system activation is used. 11 seconds
is used for staff premovement and fire alarm panel observation time. 20 seconds is used for staff
#1 travel time beginning at the nurse station to the fire room to verify a fire. For purposes of
estimating the RSET, 41-seconds notification time is being used.
Pre-Evacuation. Time for pre-evacuation could be significant due to many factors in a nursing
home (i.e., residents don’t hear the alarm, are sleeping, need to get dressed, need to get
belongings, need staff to tell them is a fire, etcetera.) In the 2012 edition of Smoke Control
Engineering Handbook by John Klote, reference to taking a few minutes to an hour or more if
the individual sleeps through the event was reported. For purposes of this paper, residents will
be assumed to be in their rooms behind a one-hour rated, manually operated door and ready to
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evacuate when staff arrives to assist them with egress to the safe harbor area. For purposes of
estimating the RSET, 10-seconds for each room will be assessed to staff.
October 2020 report Investigating Evacuation Behaviour in Retirement Facilities: Case Studies
from New Zealand, revealed the most probable pre-evacuation time in the monitored retirement
home was between 60 seconds (1-minute) and 116 seconds (or 1.93 minutes). Study reported
cumulative probability distribution shows that about 96% of the data will most likely be 168
seconds (2.80 minutes) or less. Having witness many healthcare facility fire drills, 168 seconds
is heavily dependent upon time of day or night and the activity level of the residents at that time.
The value used in this report for calculating RSET pre-evacuation time will be 168 seconds.
The pre-evacuation time will begin at the start of the alarm. Rescue operations conducted prior
to the pre-evacuation time of 168 seconds, the staff member will be assessed an additional 60
seconds per occupant. The 60 second assessment is assumed to be viable based on the lower
probable pre-evacuation time in the New Zealand study and the staff helping the resident
expedite pre-evacuation and into their wheelchair. Depending upon what time of day it is, any
activities going on, residents maybe sleeping, wandering about, and in many instances, times
assumed could be applicable. In many fire drills I have witnessed, observation of occupants fully
aware of the fire alarm sounding and get grumpy and difficult because it’s interrupting their
dinner, favorite TV show, game or activity, bath, nap, etcetera, and create additional time delay
for being difficult. For purposes of this project, assumption will be no time delay is observed with
difficult residents.
Evacuation Time. The maximum compartment size allowed by prescriptive code is 22,500 ft2.
The maximum distance of travel allowed by prescriptive code in a sprinklered facility is 200 feet.
In this study, the selected compartment (Number 5) is 11,390 ft2 in size. The maximum travel
distance is 195 feet. The egress quantity, locations, and width are adequately met. The means
of egress is not obstructed. With one staff to ten or more mobility impaired residents, assisted
egress is likely to be the achilleas’ heel and result in a lengthy evacuation time.
The 2020 study entitled Investigating Evacuation Behaviour in Retirement Facilities: Case
Studies from New Zealand observed horizontal walking speeds of 0.3 m/s to 0.73 m/s (0.98 ft/s
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to 3.4 ft/s) of residents when using walking aids in uncongested situations. SFPE Handbook of
Fire Protection Engineering, 3rd Edition, Chapter 3-14 Emergency Movement authors Nelson &
Mowrer reported a normal walking speed of a healthy adult of being 1.19 m/s (3.9 ft/s). This rate
of travel will be used initially for the staff. A conservative assumption of 10% reduction in travel
speed of staff due to fatigue will be calculated upon the start of each trip starting at the East exit.
Hand calculated time of egress to the East exit (East of Room #5 and Room #6 in Figure 54)
assumes the following:
•

Each room has only one mobility impaired occupant including Room #1 and Room #18
shown in Figure 54 (these two rooms (#1 & #18) each have the capacity to be double
occupancy rooms).

•

A total of 18 residents and two staff members are assumed to be in smoke compartment
#5 at the time of fire. No other smoke compartments are affected from the fire or smoke
in the design fire.

•

The facility reported 90% of the residents (18*.9=16.2) would require staff assistance to
evacuate. This evaluation will use 16 residents; two of the 18 residents will be assumed
to be capable of self-rescue and are designated to be the two closest rooms to the East
exit, Room #5 and Room #6 shown in Figure 54;

•

West egress stairwell between Room #1 and Room #18 is not used in this evaluation.

•

Staff rate of travel being at 1.19 m/s (3.9 ft/s) with their travel speed decreasing at 10%
each trip due to fatigue.

•

Each staff will assist two residents in wheelchairs per round trip without complications,
obstructions, or congestion through the East exit safe harbor (smoke compartment #6 in
Figure 54).

•

Residents are presumed safely staged in the corridor while staff is assisting the second
room rescue on each trip.

•

Residents are contained in their rooms behind the closed, 1-hour rated door, ready and
waiting for staff to assist with evacuation except those being rescued during the premovement time.
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•

Each room will require staff 10-seconds to enter the room and vacate with the waiting
resident, except for those being assisted prior to 168 seconds (pre-movement time) of fire
alarm activation. Those being evacuated within the first 168 seconds, the staff travel time
is being assessed an additional 60 seconds to each resident for staff to expedite premovement time, in addition to the 10-second enter and vacate time previously noted.

•

No occupants are in the warming kitchen during evacuation of fire.

•

The two residents closest to the East exit in Room #5 and Room #6 (shown in Figure 54)
will self-evacuate to safe harbor by 168 seconds from the activation of the fire alarm. Both
staff are located at the nurse station upon activation of the fire alarm.

The following conservative assessment is based on the stated assumptions and are to estimate
travel time needed to evacuate smoke compartment #5. The calculated time estimated will be
compared with the simulated design fire, fractional effective dose (FED) and smoke obscuration
visibility values to evaluate tenable conditions.
The value calculated for the verification of fire in the previous notification section of RSET are
precluded in this section. Staff #1 verifies there is a fire in Room #2 and begins to assist resident
rescue in Room #2 and evacuation time begins. 70 seconds(s) is assessed to staff #1 to aid in
expediting resident pre-movement (60 s) and for aiding in resident rescue (10 s). Staff #1 travels
with Room #2 resident into corridor (5.63 ft / 3.9 ft/s) in 3.1 seconds. Staff #1 travel time in to
and out of Room #1 (5.63 ft / 3.9 ft/s) in 6.2 seconds. A 70 second time is assessed to staff #1
for assisting in Room #1 evacuation (10 s) and assisting resident in pre-movement (60 s). Staff
travel to safe harbor (142 ft / 3.9 ft/s) with two residents in wheelchairs is 36.4 seconds. Total
elapsed time since fire alarm activation (time zero) is calculated at 185.4 seconds.

Staff #2 begins pre-movement to provide evacuation assistance at 31 seconds after staff #1
verifies is an actual fire as outlined in the emergency plan procedures. Staff #2 otherwise
duplicates travel distances as Staff #1. Total time to reach the East exit with two residents
(185.4s + 31s) is 216.4 seconds from the fire alarm activation.
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In total, trip one for staff members provide a total of four residents being assisted to the East exit
safe harbor during an elapsed time of 185.4 seconds for staff #2, and 216.4 seconds for staff
#1. At 168 seconds from the activation of the fire alarm, the two residents closest to the East exit
(room #6 and room #7) self-evacuate, bringing the total of six residents to the East exit safe
harbor by 216.4 seconds (3.6 minutes).

The staff travel speed is reduced from 1.19 m/s by 10% to 1.07 m/s (3.51 ft/s) due to staff fatigue
going into the second trip to assist with evacuation. Staff #1 travels from the East exit to room
#3, the Spa, and room #4 on the north side. The additional 60 second assessment of time to
staff with assisting residents in pre-movement time is not applicable for the remainder of the
resident evacuations, as the 168 second resident premovement time has been reached by the
time staff reaches the remaining residents where they are ready and waiting for staff arrival to
assist in evacuation.

The second trip of Staff #1 travels from the East exit to room #3 on the North side (131 ft /
3.51ft/s) in 37.3 seconds. Staff #1 is assessed 10 seconds for assisting the resident in room #3.
Staff #1 travels with resident to the next room, the Spa room (29.38 ft / 3.51 ft/s) in 8.4 seconds.
Staff #1 is assessed 10 seconds for entering and clearing the Spa, no resident is in the spa.
Staff #1 travels to room #4 on the North side (97.5 ft / 3.51ft/s) in 27.8 seconds. Staff #1 is
assessed 10 seconds for assisting the resident in room #4. Staff #1 travels to safe harbor (51 ft
/ 3.51 ft/s) with two residents in wheelchairs in 14.5 seconds. 118 seconds is calculated for the
second trip by staff #1. A total elapsed time for staff #1 since time zero is calculated at 303.4
seconds (185.4s+118.0s).

The second trip of Staff #2 travels from East exit to room #16 on the South side (131 ft / 3.51ft/s)
in 37.3 seconds. Staff #2 is assessed 10 seconds for assisting the room #16 resident. Staff #2
travels to room #15 (29.8 ft / 3.51ft/s) in 8.4 seconds. Staff #2 is assessed 10 seconds for
assisting the resident in room #15. Staff #2 travels to safe harbor (117 ft / 3.51 ft/s) with two
residents in wheelchairs in 32.8 seconds. In total, staff #2 completes the second trip in 98.5
seconds. A total elapsed time for staff #2 since time zero is 345.9 seconds (216.4s + 98.5s). A
total of twelve residents are accounted for at the East exit safe harbor.
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The staff travel speed is reduced from 1.07 m/s by 10% to 0.903 m/s (3.16 ft/s) due to staff
fatigue going into the third trip to assist with evacuation. Staff #1 begins assisting staff #2 with
resident evacuation on the south side starting at room #14. The third trip of Staff #1 travels from
the East exit to room #14 on the southside (114 ft / 3.16 ft/s) in 36.1 seconds. Staff #1 is assessed
10 seconds for assisting the resident in room #14. Staff #1 travels 31.5 ft to room #13 (31.5 ft /
3.16 ft/s) in 10.0 seconds. Staff #1 is assessed 10 seconds for assisting the resident in room
#13. Staff #1 travels to safe harbor (91.25 ft / 3.16 ft/s) with two residents in wheelchairs in 28.9
seconds. 95.0 seconds is calculated for staff #1 third trip. A total elapsed time for staff #1 since
time zero is 399.4 seconds (185.4s + 118.0s + 95.0s).

The third trip of Staff #2 travels from the East exit to room #12 along the South side (91.25ft /
3.16 ft/s) in 28.9 seconds. Staff #2 is assessed 10 seconds for assisting the resident in room
#12. Staff #2 travels 34.75 ft to room #11 (34.75 ft / 3.16 ft/s) in 11.0 seconds. Staff #2 is
assessed 10 seconds for assisting the resident in room #11. Staff #2 travels to safe harbor (65
ft / 3.16 ft/s) with two residents in wheelchairs in 20.6 seconds. The third trip is calculated at 80.5
seconds for staff #2. A total elapsed time for staff #2 since time zero is 426.4 seconds (216.4s
+ 98.5s + 80.5s). A total of fourteen residents are accounted for at the East exit safe harbor.

The staff travel speed is reduced from 0.903 m/s by 10% to 0.813 m/s (2.84 ft/s) due to staff
fatigue going into the fourth trip to assist with evacuation. Each staff assists with the two
remaining residents in room #10, room #9, room #8, and room #5.

The fourth trip of Staff #1 travels from the East exit to room #5 (31.5 ft / 2.84ft/s) on the North
side in 11.1 seconds. Staff #1 is assessed 10 seconds for assisting the resident in room #5. Staff
#1 travels from room #5 to room #8 (30.0 ft / 2.84 ft/s) on the South side in 10.6 seconds. Staff
#1 is assessed 10 seconds for assisting the resident in room #8. Staff #1 travels to the East exit
safe harbor (31.5 ft / 2.84 ft/s) with two residents in wheelchairs in 11.1 seconds. 52.8 seconds
is calculated for the fourth trip of staff #1. A total elapsed time for staff #1 calculated since time
zero is 451.2 seconds or 7.52 minutes.
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The fourth trip of Staff #2 travels from the East exit to room #10 along the South side (63.5 ft /
2.84 ft/s) in 22.4 seconds. Staff #2 is assessed 10 seconds for assisting the resident in room
#10. Staff #2 travels to room #9 (24.0 ft / 2.84 ft/s) in 8.4 seconds. Staff #2 is assessed 10
seconds for assisting the resident in room #9. Staff #2 travels to safe harbor (51.8 ft / 2.84 ft/s)
with two residents in wheelchairs in 18.2 seconds. Staff #2 fourth trip is calculated to take 69.0
seconds. A total elapsed time for staff #2 since time zero is 464.4 seconds (216.4s + 98.5s +
80.5s + 69.0s) or 7.74 minutes. A total of eighteen residents and two staff are accounted for at
the East exit safe harbor.

FIGURE 54 – 2ND FLOOR SMOKE COMPARTMENTS.

◦
◦
◦
◦

Detection Time – 4 seconds (Design Fire Simulation).
Notification Time – 41 seconds (Fire alarm system activation, staff verification).
Pre-evacuation – 168 seconds (New Zealand study).
Evacuation Time – 464.4 seconds (Staff #2 completes last person evacuation).
Predicted RSET total time = 677.4 seconds (11.3 minutes)
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The RSET calculations provided are based on certain assumptions and have inherent
limitations. The findings may or may not have reasonable predictive capabilities for a given
situation and should only be interpreted by an informed user. The calculate d results provide
no guarantee to the accuracy of the calculations.
SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire, 2 nd edition stipulates the user of the guide should
recognize that the definitions of ASET and RSET focus on the “individual” as each occupant in
a fire scenario will have their own ASET and RSET value depending on the individual’s
characteristics (e.g., age, physical capabilities), location at the time of a fire and path of travel
relative to potential exposure to fire effluent. The ASET value is to be compared against RSET
with the goal that (ASET) be greater than (RSET). By estimating ASET minus RSET for each
person, it is possible to estimate how long it would take for the last person to reach safety. This
approach can take extensive calculation time, since ASET minus RSET must be calculated for
all individuals who are at above average risk. A limitation of this approach is that it may be difficult
to estimate the rate of escape progress for the least capable evacuees.

The guide further suggests simplification can be used for occupants of a space and treated as
a uniform group. Group ASET and RSET values are estimated from a single value for
incapacitation, as well as a single set of assumptions of occupant characteristics which is
typically a conservative approach which has limitations.

Occupant behavior during a fire is quite complex. Integration of qualitative and quantitative data
and engineering methods to evaluate the time for evacuation or movement to a place of safety
is evaluated.
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SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire, 2 nd edition specifies five basic tasks are generally
needed:

1. Define building characteristics and building evacuation strategy.
2. Review occupant characteristics and identify occupant groups’ assumptions.
3. Develop pre-evacuation time assumptions.
4. Evaluate/calculate movement time.
5. Evaluate/calculate the fire environment impact on exposed occupants.”
In years past, human behavior issues were left to behavioral scientists and researchers. In
performance-based design, the importance of human factors and behavior in building design is
a significant component in fire protection engineering. Many studies look at human behavior and
emergency evacuation. SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire, 2 nd edition Table 2.3 (Figure
55) includes factors and considerations that may play a role in such evacuation analysis. The
following section will introduce flammability assessment considerations.

Figure 55 - Factors and Considerations in Human Behavior Analysis.
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Flammability Assessment
Interior wall and ceiling finishes are Class A throughout. Class A interior wall and ceiling finishes are
characterized from ASTM E 84 test method entitled surface characteristics of building materials.
Those with flame spread index of 0–25 and a smoke density developed, 0–450 are considered Class
A finishes. Interior floor finish in this building meets the prescriptions of NFPA 101 section 10.2.7.2
with a minimum critical radiant flux of 0.1 W/cm 2. For purposes of this paper, the floor will be
considered adiabatic surface. Egress stairwells are concrete, ceramic/porcelain tile on the hazardous
room floors, solid vinyl plank flooring in common areas and resident rooms, small areas of Class 1
carpet in the four, 310 ft2 living rooms.
Combustible furnishings include typical residential / office setting items. As shown in Figure 58, there
are small sections of carpet, plastic items, wood furniture, upholstered furniture, paper/cardboard.
Holiday seasons attract decorations of various types throughout the facility and are strictly regulated
by NFPA 101 and CMS that stipulate those type of items. This simulation will not consider holiday
decorations into the design fire simulation.
Combustible decorations in general are prohibited unless are of flame-retardant or treated with an
approved fire-retardant coating that is listed and labeled for application to the material to which it is
applied. The decorations meet the requirements of NFPA 701, entitled Standard Methods of Fire
Tests for Flame Propagation of Textiles and Films. The decorations exhibit a heat release rate not
exceeding 100 kW when tested in accordance with NFPA 289, entitled Standard Method of Fire Test
for Individual Fuel Packages, using the 20-kW ignition source. The decorations, such as
photographs, paintings, and other art, are attached directly to the walls, ceiling, and non-fire-rated
doors in accordance with the following:
•

Decorations on non-fire-rated doors that do not interfere with the operation or any required
latching of the door and do not exceed 30 percent of the wall, ceiling, and door areas inside
any room or space of a smoke compartment that is protected throughout by an approved
automatic sprinkler system or do not exceed 50 percent of the wall, ceiling, and door areas
inside patient sleeping rooms having a capacity not exceeding four persons, in a smoke
compartment that is protected throughout by an approved, supervised automatic sprinkler
system.

Copyright © 2021 by Edward Hale, All Rights Reserved.

Page 115 of 263

Of particular interest, the NFPA 101 prescription specified “ceiling areas”. Fully sprinklered
facilities must comply with sprinkler obstruction requirements of NFPA 13 obstruction to
discharge or from obstructions that prevent sprinkler discharge from reaching the hazard. The
facility is aware of the 18-inch rule as most of them have gotten a citation for this condition.
After installation of the sprinkler system, NFPA 25 section 5.2.1.2 prescribes the minimum
clearance required by the installation standard shall be maintained below all sprinkler deflectors.

No candles with a wick, or other open flame or smoldering devices like incense. Other
prescriptive codes specify no combustible items allowed to be attached to fire rated door
assemblies or in the egress stairwells. The following section will introduce the design fire
simulation.
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.

FIGURE 56 - INTERIOR FURNISHINGS: Top Left – Living Room; Top Right – Activity/Dining Room;
Bottom Left – Main Entrance Lobby; Bottom Right – Resident Room.
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Design Fire
Introduction
ASTM E 2280-13 entitled Standard Guide for Fire Hazard Assessment of the Effect of
Upholstered Seating Furniture Within Patient Rooms of Healthcare Facilities test fire conducted
(Appendix E) was used as a guide in the design fire model constructed for this exercise The test
embodies the maximum heat release rate and temperature values for this design fire. The test
revealed moderate fire curves in a patient room recommendation for fire hazard assessment
with wood flooring. The maximum HRR produced in the test was 2,418 kW at 440-seconds, an
upper layer temperature of 1,325 °C, and flashover occurring at 366-seconds. This test included
several combustible items in the patient room. The design fire constructed for this project
includes two combustible items, the wall TV and the dresser.

The design fire constructed for this project assumes the fire initiation to be from a faulty USA
made, wall mounted Television (TV) as shown in Figure 59. Due to impregnated fire retardants,
the wall TV does not generate much heat, though enough to pool and ignite surrounding
combustible items. In this design fire simulation, a wooden dresser below the TV is the only
surrounding combustible item being considered. The fire-retardant materials identified in the
plastics of the TV were brominated dibenzo dioxins and furans.

The fire was constructed using a simple chemistry profile of a Propane (C3H8) burner in a wellventilated atmosphere. For the purposes of this project, the simulated design fire will produce
only Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Carbon Monoxide (CO), Nitrogen (N2), Oxygen (O2), Soot, and
Water Vapor (H2O). There are many products of combustion produced from the ignition source
that were not evaluated that are likely to impact incapacitation criteria and smoke detector
activation

time.

These

include

Propene,

Bromo-Methane,

Butadiene,

Acrolein,

Dichloromethane, Vinyl-Acetate, Benzene, Methyl-Methacrylate, Toluene, Ethyl-Benzene,
Styrene,

Chloro-Methane,

Napthalene,

Propenenitrile,

Benzaldehyde,

Benzonitrile,

Phenylethyne, Indene, and Alph-Methylstyrene.
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Ignition Source
In a 2001 study by Hietaniemi and Mikkola entitled Burning of Electrical Household Appliances:
an experimental study, peak heat release rates (HRR) recorded from the TV’s tested was 250300 kW/m2. The study indicated TV’s purchase from Japan, or the USA were imbedded with fire
retardant and are very slow to start though did burn when began to pool. The report indicated
fires were slow to start and became rapid in 1.5 minutes. The study indicated 30-40% of TV fires
remain restricted to the TV itself and did not cause severe room damage. Direct flame contact
or pooling fires near a flammable object was reported to propagate flash-over conditions, the TV
itself did not. The study found 40-60% spread beyond the TV causing property damage.

In a 2014 study by Blais and Carpenter on combustion characteristics of flat panel televisions
with and without fire retardants in the casing, the results of 18 flat screen tv’s tested in this study,
the peak HRR ranged from 2kW to 306kW; TVs made in USA had the lowest peak HRR due to
fire retardants embedded in the polymers, then Mexico, followed by Brazil. Figure 58 provides a
snapshot of the HRR plots for three USA made TVs tested in the study. Figure 59 shows HRR
produced from the wooden dresser below the TV, the fire resource in this design fire simulation
and is discussed further in the following section.

FIGURE 57 - ORIGIN OF DESIGN FIRE, TV – DESK.
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FIGURE 58 - COMBINED HEAT RELEASE RATE PLOT OF 3 US TELEVISIONS.

Primary Fire Source
The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering- 5th Edition also indicated HRR for TV’s
were between 2kW to 300kW. In this design fire simulation, the HRR of test four (5kW), shown
in Figure 58, was used for igniting the dresser. The ignition source data was not included in the
simulation and would likely impact smoke detector activation time. The HRR of the dresser fire
was ramped up to a peak HRR of 1,800 kW at 420-seconds to reflect the HRR shown in Figure
59 using a propane burner.

Figure 59 - SFPE Figure 26.41 HRR of Wooden Dresser.
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Design Fire Area of Origin
The selected area of origin of the fire will be a 2nd-Floor bedroom (top left in red of Figure 60),
near a protected egress stairwell, (center left in green of Figure 60). Due to the fire and smoke
so close to the egress, it is assumed that no evacuation from this egress will be conducted; staff
and residents will be forced to evacuate at the East exit through the smoke compartment (center
right in green of Figure 60).

FIGURE 60 - DESIGN FIRE ROOM #2.

Room #2 dimensions are X=17’-2”, Y=12’-3-1/2”, Y=8’-0”. In total, room #2 has 264 gross square
feet. There is a 4’ x 4’ fixed pane window in room #2 assumed to be closed and non-ventilating.
There is a total of 56, room #2 designs throughout the first and second floors of this facility.
Lavatory dimensions are 7’-5” x 5’-1”. Room #2 basic contents, as shown in Figure 61 include a
metal and wood bed frame with mattress, a wooden wardrobe closet, a wooden nightstand, a
metal and wood food tray, a wood chair, a wooden sink vanity, a small plastic trash can, a plastic
wall TV, and a wooden dresser. Room #2 entrance door and the lavatory door are both solid oak
wood, manually operated to open or close.
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FIGURE 61 – ROOM #2 LAYOUT AND CONTENTS.
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Figure 62 shows a top-down view of the 2nd-floor compartment #5 drawn for the zone-type model
using Pyrosim and FDS modeling software. Room #2 is on the center, top left of Figure 62.
Thermocouple devices and a smoke detector were installed in room #2. Three FED devices and
two smoke detectors were installed in the path of egress from room #2 to the East exit. Figure
63 shows a North to South horizontal view of room #2.

FIGURE 62 – TOP-DOWN VIEW OF 2ND FLOOR COMPARTMENT SIMULATION DESIGN.

FIGURE 63 - NORTH TO SOUTH VIEW OF ROOM #2.
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Design Fire Assumptions
In the design of this fire, a zone-type model was constructed. The fire sprinkler system in the building
is disabled for maintenance and nonfunctioning in the design fire simulation. Resident room doors
are solid wood, 90-minute fire rated with a metal frame. The resident room doors are manually
operated and not self-closing. Room #2 door was simulated as being closed for the first 31-seconds.
The door was opened at 32-seconds to simulate staff verifying a fire and aiding in resident rescue.
32 seconds is recognized as a very conservative number and implies staff is nearby and responds
promptly. It is assumed rescue staff are unaffected from products of combustion during rescue and
throughout the simulation assisting residents. The simulation thereafter reenacts a common
occurrence observed having conducted many fire drills at these types of facilities. While in a hurry
to evacuate, staff fails to close room #2 door after performing a rescue, allowing products of
combustion to escape into the smoke compartment.

All doors in the smoke compartment are assumed to be closed throughout the simulation except as
noted. The HVAC system shuts down upon activation of the smoke detector. All smoke barrier doors
automatically close without obstructions upon receipt of “alarm” status at the FACP. All smoke barrier
wall through-penetrations of building service equipment and joints are fully sealed. Smoke travel will
stop completely at the East end smoke barrier doors and will not contaminate the “safe” compartment
#6 when the doors are opened several times during evacuation of occupants. For purposes of this
performance-based design, a 2-meter visibility was used due to the familiarity of staff with the means
of egress, abundant egress signage and all facility lighting on emergency generator. A FED value of
0.5 for incapacitation criterion and a FED value of 1.0 for lethality criterion was used. Lastly, the
sprinkler system was considered non-functioning with all system control valves closed for
maintenance.
The reaction properties for this design fire simulation used a simple chemistry reaction type. A
ramped-up Propane (C3H8) burner positioned at the top of the dresser was selected to mimic the
HRR’s shown in Figures 58 and Figure 59. No other fuel sources in room #2 contributed to this
design fire. The default Propane reaction properties were modified to accommodate wood (pine)
values of a well-ventilated fire and were obtained from the SPFE Handbook of Fire Protection
Engineering, 5th Edition, Table A.39. A heat of combustion value of 17.9 kJ/g and a CO yield of 0.005
g/g were used. Table A.39 did not reveal a soot yield for wood (pine), though 0.015 g/g was listed
for red oak and hemlock and was used for purposes of this design fire.
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Design Fire
@ 30-Seconds:

@ 240-Seconds:

@ 360-Seconds:

@ 600-1000-Seconds:

FIGURE 64 – OVERHEAD ZONE MODEL RENDERINGS.

Design fire zone model renderings shown in Figure 64 show smoke travel throughout the smoke
compartment at intervals of 30-seconds, 240-seconds, 360-seconds, and 600-seconds through
the conclusion of the simulation of 1000-seconds. Four FED sensor devices were installed in
this simulation. One in room #2, the other three equally spaced in the means of egress of smoke
compartment #5. The first FED sensor located in room #2 reached incapacitation criteria of 0.5
at 46 seconds into the simulation; room #2 FED value of 1.0 was reached in 328 seconds. The
second FED sensor located in the corridor, outside room #2 reached a maximum value of 0.11
by the conclusion of the simulation. The third FED sensor located midway at the nurse station
reached a value of 0.05 at the conclusion of the simulation. The fourth FED sensor located at
the East exit reached a FED value of 0.04 at the conclusion of the simulation.
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Calculated estimates of the HRR needed to cause flashover, as shown in Figure 65, ranged
between 1151kW and 2630 kW. Flashover was not observed in this simulation.

INPUT PARAMETERS
ROOM LENGTH (L)

3.75 m

ROOM WIDTH (W)

5.23 m

ROOM HEIGHT (H)

2.44 m

OPENING WIDTH (Wo)

1.12 m

OPENING HEIGHT (Ho)

2.14 m

BOUNDARY CONDUCTIVITY (k)
BOUNDARY THICKNESS (d)

0.00016 kW/m.K
0.0127 m

CALCULATED PARAMETERS
BOUNDARY SURFACE AREA (At)
VENTILATION FACTOR

80.65 m2
3.51 m^5/2

BABRAUSKAS F/O PREDICTION

2630 kW

MQH F/O PREDICTION
THOMAS F/O PREDICTION

1151 kW
1973 kW

FIGURE 65 - ESTIMATES OF THE HRR NEEDED TO CAUSE FLASHOVER(F/O).

At the conclusion of the simulation (1000 seconds), a minimum visibility of 2.06 meters was
observed at the East exit in compartment #5. Room #2 maximum upper layer temperature
observed during the simulation was 854 °C in 423 seconds. Calculations using the modified
MQH correlation of the upper layer temperature (shown in Figure 66) resulted in a temperature
of 838 °C, closely comparing to values observed in the design fire simulation.
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INPUT PARAMETERS
ROOM LENGTH (L)
ROOM WIDTH (W)
ROOM HEIGHT (H)
OPENING WIDTH (Wo)
OPENING HEIGHT (Ho)
BOUNDARY CONDUCTIVITY (k)
BOUNDARY DENSITY (p)
BOUNDARY SPEC. HEAT (cp)
BOUNDARY THICKNESS (d)
FIRE HRR (Q)
FIRE LOCATION FACTOR (kLF)
CALCULATION TIME (t)
CALCULATED PARAMETERS
HEAT TRANSFER COEFF (hk)
BOUNDARY AREA (At)
VENTILATION FACTOR
TEMPERATURE RISE (dT)

3.75
5.23
2.44
1.12
2.14
0.00016
750
1.09
0.0127
1800
2
1000

m
m
m
m
m
kW/m.K
kg/m3
kJ/kg.K
m
kW
s

0.0125984
83.05
3.51
828

kW/m2.K
m2
m^5/2
C

FIRE LOCATION FACTORS
FIRE IN OPEN
FIRE ALONG WALL
FIRE IN CORNER

kLF
1
2
4

FIGURE 66 – ROOM #2 ESTIMATE OF UPPER LAYER TEMPERATURE USING MODIFIED MQH CORRELATION.

Conclusion
The RSET was calculated to take 11.3-minutes. The first FED sensor located in room #2 reached
incapacitation criteria of 0.5 at 46 seconds into the simulation; room #2 FED value of 1.0 was
reached in 328 seconds of the simulation. No other FED sensor reached incapacitation criteria
or leathal criteria in 1000 seconds, the time the design fire simulation concluded. It is likely that
the resident in the room #2 would have reached incapacitation levels due to detection time of 4
seconds and the notification time of 41 seconds (fire alarm system activation, staff verification),
totaling 45 seconds. Adding in the time assessment of 73.1 seconds to staff #1 to aid in
expediting resident pre-movement (60 seconds) and for aiding in resident rescue (10 seconds),
and 3.1 seconds for Staff #1 to travel back into the corridor. A total time of 118.1 seconds had
passed. At 118 seconds in the simulation, a FED value of 0.91 was observed inside room #2. It
is highly probable, implications for both the resident and Staff #1 would be seen in a real event.

If all assumptions were applicable and the design fire input values were precise to an actual
event, lethal criteria of occupants is highly likely, particularly at the beginning stages of the fire
involving room #2 resident and Staff #1 performing rescue. The FED values in the means of
egress did not reach incapacitating criteria by the conclusion of the simulation. Recognition is
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necessary in that many residents in this facility are assisted by supplemental oxygen. For these
occupants having difficulty breathing in normal, non-fire conditions, a real event could likely
result in a high probability of getting some form of respiratory distress, potentially being lethal.

The design fire assumed a 2-meter visibility as the minimum visibility for tenability based on
many researchers suggesting visibility limits of between 4 feet and 65 feet depending upon
familiarity of egress, lighting, and irritation of smoke. At the conclusion of the simulation, 2.06meter visibility was observed at the East exit.

An important element to this design fire was to present a cause and effect from staff not closing
the door to the fire area after rescue and the effect on RSET. The solid oak wood doors to all
the resident rooms are 1.75 inches thick and have a one-hour fire rating. These doors will provide
residents and staff much needed time of tenability. Room #2 door simulated being left open by
staff after resident rescue allowed products of combustion to spread throughout the smoke
compartment. In an environment with occupants being over 65 and many dependent upon
oxygen supplement during their daily routine, lower FED values could result in a higher number
of occupants reaching their FED incapacitating criteria.

In many observations of fire drills over the years, not closing the door to the fire area was a
frequent occurrence. Fire containment is an essential component to safe evacuation.
Containment will also confine the heat from a fire to the area of origin where a functioning
sprinkler system would activate to control or extinguish the fire. A properly maintained and
functioning sprinkler system will aide in additional time for evacuation.
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Project Conclusion
The prescriptive-based egress requirement in a fully sprinklered, mobility impaired healthcare
facility to safely accommodate the slow evacuations studied in recent years is hardly adequate
protection for real world, safe evacuation in a mobility impaired, low staff to occupant ratio,
healthcare facility. A 200-feet maximum travel allowance to a means of egress in a light hazard
fully sprinklered healthcare facility with a low number of staff to assist residents is heavily
dependent upon the fire detection system, the fire suppression system and containment systems
being properly and frequently inspected, tested, and maintained. Having spent several years as
healthcare fire and life safety surveyor, quite often, lack of maintenance to the detection and
sprinkler systems were identified; nearly always, observation of the smoke barrier wall
assemblies revealed improper fire stopping, typically above the suspended ceiling tiles. Poorly
maintained or non-functioning fire door assemblies were also frequent observations. Four to five
deficiencies were typically cited at each facilities annual survey.

In 2016, CMS funded facilities were required to start performing annual fire door inspections and
repair any deficiencies. Supporting evidence suggests similar requirement would be supported
for the annual inspection and maintenance of fire stopping smoke barrier walls/floors/ceilings
and other fire rated wall/floor/ceiling assemblies in all facilities on an annual basis. Professional
firestopping will minimize fire and smoke travel in compartments allowing more time for the staff
and mobility impaired occupants to evacuate a fire area.
It is no secret that seniors and mobility impaired persons require additional time for evacuation
during an emergency event. With the bulk of the population of these facilities being incapable of
self-preservation requiring staff assistance, the maximum travel distance of 200 feet should be
heavily scrutinized during design even in a sprinklered building. 100 feet is more than reasonable
to increase the likelihood of the safe evacuation in the event of a fire where resident to staff
ratios are strained. The benefit of installing an additional exit in smoke compartments that
accommodates the mobility impaired is easy to design, cost effective safety, and greatly reduces
evacuation time during in a fire. Another consideration could require all resident sleeping rooms
be 1-hour rated.
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One major objective with defend in place strategy is containing a fire to the area of origin. One
or two smoke compartments are much easier and quicker to manage an evacuation than that of
an entire healthcare facility full of mobility impaired or ill occupants. Many passive lifesaving
systems work together to increase the likelihood that full building evacuation is not necessary.
Inspection, testing, and maintenance of these systems cannot be over emphasized. The subject
facility has several smoke compartments to evacuate occupants to, as well as the original
building, if necessary. The unfortunate reality is, this and many other similar facilities struggle in
obtaining enough staff to adequately support the growing number of seniors and mobility
impaired occupants residing in long term care / skilled nursing facilities.
In the unlikely event a full evacuation of the 2nd-floor was deemed necessary, the use of an
elevator car to aide in occupant evacuation was studied and presented during the final
presentation of this project. The prescriptive codes do allow occupant evacuation by elevator in
healthcare facilities when included in the emergency plan. For this facility, due to the many
available smoke compartments and readily available egress to the existing building a short
distance from the elevator cars, it was suggested to emphasize evacuation from a single smoke
compartment and the importance of inspection, testing, and maintenance of the detection,
suppression, and compartmentation systems. For that reason, the occupant elevator evacuation
study was omitted from this report.
Frequent training of various scenarios for all staff and occupants is another key action that must
be conducted. Required by NFPA 101, all staff on every shift is required to participate in at least
one fire drill each month. Additional training is highly suggested where resident to staff ratios are
as they are in this facility. Upon recognition of a fire, containment by closing doors to that area
is essential to maximize evacuation time of the mobility impaired, staff dependent occupants.
The prescriptive code section of this report identified two areas of concern, the one being the
roof deck was not constructed as one hour rated assembly. The other being the window
openings between the new and old buildings. While a compromise of the roof was addressed
through additional detection devices and dry-pipe suppression in the attic, the windows would
need field inspection to verify standard glass as shown on the construction drawings was
installed. In a worst-case scenario, adding water curtain sprinkler protection to the applicable
windows would be an option to meet prescriptive code requirements.
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Lastly, the prescriptive code requires the facility have a fire safety management plan. The plan
specifies when a person is involved in the fire (immediate) area, the discoverer should
immediately go to the aid of the person(s) involved, if safe to do so, and remove all persons
directly within the immediate area of the fire while also calling code red with the exact fire
location. The fire safety management plan fails to address criteria for staff to determine “if safe
to do so” and what justifies closing the door, leaving an occupant behind to save the life of
numerous others.

The performance-based design employed a zone-type model simulation presented tenability
concerns during the evacuation. The RSET was calculated to take 11.3 minutes to evacuate the
entire smoke compartment and assumed staff are unaffected by the smoke. 2 meters above the
floor visibility threshold at the East exit was not reached during the 1000 second simulation. The
FED sensor near the East exit did not reach 0.5 incapacitation criteria during the 1000 second
simulation.
Several assumptions were made to represent a worst-case scenario. Assumptions like limiting
the number of staff to only two, the egress closest to room #2 not being used due to proximity of
the fire, the fire sprinkler system out of service for maintenance, and the room #2 door being left
open after rescue, may or may not be present during a real fire. It is reasonable to believe, with
the advancements in smoke detector technology, detector response would be probable at some
point during the wall TV smoldering or pooling stage to alert occupants prior to the combustion
of the dresser.
The FED value for incapacitation and lethality are general values selected based on the group
of occupants as a whole and not individually. Values for each person may increase or decrease
the time for tenability in an actual fire and are quite complex to calculate. Senior occupants
having poor breathing capability in non-fire conditions could experience a FED of 0.5 as lethal
criterion.
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A maximum upper layer temperature observed at the ceiling was 854 °C in 423 seconds in the
simulation. Calculated estimates of the HRR needed to cause flashover ranged between 1,151
kW and 2,630 kW. Flashover was not observed in the simulation. A single fuel source being
limited to HRR of 1,800 kW and the room being well-ventilated is likely the reason.
The simulated design fire supported the importance of implementing a proactive inspection,
testing, and maintenance program of the detection, suppression, and compartmentation
systems, as well as the need to provide for improved resident to staff ratio to decrease
evacuation times in the event of an actual fire.
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Appendices
APPENDIX A – Fire Alarm System
Battery Calculations and Voltage Drops

Battery Distribution Chart
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Fire Alarm Control Panel Current Draw
Quantity x [device current draw] = total current draw per device (in amps)

FCPS-24S8 Power Supply Current Draw
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Battery Distribution Chart

FCPS-24S8 Power Supply
Quantity x [device current draw] = total current draw per device (in amps)
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Notification Appliances - NAC #1
FACP Notification Appliance Circuit (1.5 amps)

Source Voltage: 20.40 VDC Low Battery

Notification Appliances - NAC #2
FACP Notification Appliance Circuit (1.5 amps)
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Notification Appliances - NAC #3
FACP Notification Appliance Circuit (1.5 amps)

Source Voltage: 20.40 VDC Low Battery

Notification Appliances - NAC #4
FACP Notification Appliance Circuit (1.5 amps)

Source Voltage: 20.40 VDC Low Battery
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Notification Appliances - NAC #1
FCPS-24S8 Notification Appliance Circuit (3.0 amps)

Source Voltage: 20.40 VDC Low Battery

Notification Appliances - NAC #2
FCPS-24S8 Notification Appliance Circuit (3.0 amps)

Source Voltage: 20.40 VDC Low Battery
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Notification Appliances - NAC #3
FCPS-24S8 Notification Appliance Circuit (3.0 amps)

Source Voltage: 20.40 VDC Low Battery

Notification Appliances - NAC #4
FCPS-24S8 Notification Appliance Circuit (3.0 amps)

Source Voltage: 20.40 VDC Low Battery

Strikethrough indicates a value below the device's minimum voltage at indicated location and
wire gauge. These calculations assume a worst-case source voltage as measured by UL with
the batteries depleted to 20.4 volts. Under AC power and for most of the drain cycle of the
batteries, the circuit voltages will be substantially higher and thus, would support a greater
number of devices. A device's minimum operating voltage is derived from the UL-requirement
that it operate within a Regulated Voltage Range (16VDC - 33VDC).

Copyright © 2021 by Edward Hale, All Rights Reserved.

Page 141 of 263

APPENDIX B – Sprinkler System Hydraulic Design Data
Sprinkler Design Area #2 (Attic) Hand & Computer Calculations
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Computer Generated Hydraulic Calculations
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APPENDIX C - Fire Safety Management Plan
To provide proper protection of facility occupants, prompt, and effective action in a uniform rapid response from all
staff is necessary to ensure the protection of all persons in the event of a fire emergency, for the evacuation to safe
areas of refuge, and for appropriate evacuation from the building when necessary and shall include all of the
following

REMEMBER → → [ T - R - A - C – E ]
Use Code Phrase
TELL SOMEONE – CODE RED
The discoverer of any smoke or fire shall immediately announce “CODE RED” at the top of your
voice with the exact fire location, three times, gaining the attention of nearby coworkers and
other occupants.

Evacuation of Immediate Area
RESCUE – Immediate area
When a person is involved in the fire area, the discoverer should immediately go to the aid of
the person(s) involved, if safe to do so, and remove all persons directly within the immediate
area of the fire while also calling aloud CODE RED with the exact fire location.

IF readily available, the discoverer can take a portable fire extinguisher into the immediate area
to aid in rescue. Relocate the person(s) involved in the fire area to a designated safe area. Close
the door to the fire area to contain the fire. The opposite side of the fire doors of the adjoining
smoke compartment is a safe area of refuge. Residents restricted to a bed shall be removed
utilizing emergency evacuation procedures such as the blanket drag or two-person carry.
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Copyright © 2021 by Edward Hale, All Rights Reserved.

Page 152 of 263

Use of Alarms
ACTIVATE ALARM
If the fire alarm system has not been activated after the rescue of all endangered persons, locate
the nearest fire alarm manual pull station to manually activate the fire alarm to summon
assistance. The red colored fire alarm manual pull stations are located at every emergency exit
in the building, at each cross-corridor doors, and at the top and bottom of the stairwells. To
activate the fire alarm manual pull station, push in, and pull down on the pull station lever to
activate the alarm. There may be a few seconds delay before the horn/strobes will activate.

Upon activation of the fire alarm, all fire doors using a magnetic hold open device will self-close,
the 1st-floor charge nurse shall designate staff to each 1 st-floor exit door to monitor occupant
traffic. The charge nurse will advise the fire department of incident status upon their arrival.

During a fire alarm activation, no persons shall enter the building except on duty
employees and public safety personnel, NO EXCEPTIONS!

Upon hearing and seeing the fire alarm activated, all attendants protecting the doors to the
exterior of the building shall promptly obtain a portable radio, turn on full volume and quickly
locate to your assigned exit, and wait further instructions from Charge Nurse / Incident
Commander.

Isolation of Fire
CONTAIN FIRE
Close all doors to the fire area to prevent the spread of fire and smoke. After clearing the area
or room for occupants, close all applicable doors in the smoke compartment to prevent spread
of fire and smoke. Turn on lights if dark and safe to do so. All magnetic door holders at the fire
rated walls will automatically release upon activation of the fire alarm system. When instructed
by the charge nurse/incident commander, shut off the zone oxygen valve to the fire area. If a
resident is on oxygen, take portable oxygen cart from supply room for use.
NEXT PAGE →
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Extinguish / Evacuation
EXTINGUISH FIRE / EVACTUATE SMOKE COMPARTMENT
Extinguish
Available personnel who have been properly trained in the safe use and operation of portable
fire extinguishers may attempt to extinguish the fire IF, is reasonably safe to do so; to aide in
rescue of anyone in immediate harm; the fire sprinkler system is not spraying water.
Remember P.A.S.S.

Pull, Aim, Squeeze and Sweep to use fire extinguisher.

P – Pull the pin,

A – Aim the extinguisher at the base of the fire,

S – Squeeze the handle,

S – Sweep side to side.

Evacuate all occupants from the smoke compartment involved with fire.
All available personnel are to report to fire area to assist in removing residents in immediate
danger, clearing obstructions within the corridors, if any, and removal of all remaining occupants
through the fire doors in the adjoining smoke compartment.

Close resident doors as you evacuate each room and mark all evacuated rooms with the allclear tag on the closed door. If a fire is reported on the 1st-floor, the 2nd-floor charge nurse shall
direct staff for resident evacuation of the smoke compartment above the reported fire location.

Charge Nurse / Incident Commander
CNIC or designee shall overhead page “CODE RED” and the exact location.
CNIC or designee shall call fire department / 9-1-1.
[Provide as many relevant details on the fire emergency as possible, including fire location,
sprinkler system activation, any injuries, evacuation status, any unaccounted occupants,
etcetera. Stay on the phone with 9-1-1 until fire department arrives.]
CHIC or designee shall begin to prepare for a Full Building Evacuation
[Quick Ref: Full Building Evacuation Procedure - Tab 7, Page 11 of Emergency Plans Book]
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Transmission of Fire Alarm to Fire Department
Upon activation of the fire alarm system, the automatic dialer within the fire alarm panel will call
and notify the UL Listed Alarm Monitoring Company who will in turn notify the fire department /
9-1-1 Emergency Dispatch. The charge nurse or designee shall also call the Fire Dept. / 9-1-1
providing as much detail on the incident as possible. Caller shall stay on the phone with dispatch
until the fire department arrives.

IF YOU HEAR THE FIRE ALARM AND FIRE IS NOT IN YOUR AREA
Listen closely for an overhead page of the fire location.
If overhead page is not heard yet, check the fire alarm panel located at each charge nurses’
station on each floor or at the 1st-floor North entrance welcome desk for device activation
location.
DO NOT SILENCE THE FIRE ALARM!
Overhead page “CODE RED” and location if not heard yet. All available personnel report to
assist evacuation in fire area. Never leave patient areas unattended.
A supervisor/Charge Nurse shall report to 1st-floor North entrance Fire Alarm Control Panel in
the event of additional emergencies and to direct operations and assist the fire department.
Upon activation of the fire alarm, all fire doors will close. The 1st-floor charge nurse shall
designate staff to each 1st-floor exit door to monitor occupant traffic and advise fire department
upon arrival.

All door attendants shall promptly obtain a portable radio, turn on to a high volume and quickly
locate to assigned exit, waiting further instructions from Charge Nurse / Incident Commander.

During a fire alarm activation, no persons shall enter the building, except employees
and public safety personnel, NO EXCEPTIONS!!
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A well-rehearsed fire safety plan, with frequent and professional inspection, testing, and
maintenance of the key life safety systems (detection, suppression, and containment) are the
essential components to a favorable outcome during a fire in this multistory healthcare facility.
Fire simulation drills will be performed at least once monthly on each shift at varying times. All
staff must participate. All staff must sign drill log during post event critique that will be performed
following each fire drill to find weaknesses and improve staff performance.

Fire Alarm System Is Out-Of-Order
If the fire alarm system is out of order for 4-hours in a 24-hour period, a fire watch shall be
implemented. Physical Plant Director shall be notified promptly and will perform or assign
designated person(s) to perform constant rounds, facility wide, seeking out smoke/fire. This shall
be the designated persons sole duties during fire watch. The designated person(s) shall always
have, a means of communication capable of reaching 9-1-1 in the event of a fire/smoke reported.
The Administrator, Physical Plant Director, or Director of Nursing shall overhead page FIRE
WATCH IN PROGRESS and when declared All-Clear by Physical Plant Director, member of
management shall overhead page, FIRE WATCH ALL CLEAR.

Any person discovering a fire when the Fire Alarm System is out of order, they should overhead
page “CODE RED” and the exact location three consecutive times, then perform Immediate
Fire Procedure Steps above.
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Fire Sprinkler System Is Out-Of-Order
If the fire sprinkler system is out of order for 10-hours in a 24-hour period, a fire watch shall be
implemented. Designated person(s) sole duties shall be to perform constant rounds, facility wide,
seeking out smoke/fire. The designated person(s) shall have at all times, a means of
communication capable of reaching 9-1-1 in the event of a fire/smoke reported. The
Administrator, Physical Plant Director, or Director of Nursing shall overhead page FIRE WATCH
IN PROGRESS and when declared All-Clear by Physical Plant Director, member of
management shall overhead page, FIRE WATCH ALL CLEAR.

Any person discovering a fire when the Fire Sprinkler System is out of order, they should
overhead page “CODE RED” and the exact location three consecutive times, then perform
Immediate Fire Procedure Steps above.
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Fire and Life Safety System Inspection, Testing, & Maintenance
Physical Plant Director is responsible for coordinating with the applicable third-party certified firm
for the inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) of the following fire and life safety systems at
intervals specified and per the minimum requirements, of the appropriate edition, National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) standard as referenced by 2012 NFPA 101, Life Safety Code
and the 2012 NFPA 99, Healthcare Facilities Code:

•

Fire Alarm System – Semi Annual, Annual.

•

Fire Sprinkler System – Quarterly, Annual

•

Emergency Generator – Annual

•

Fire Extinguishers – Annual

•

Kitchen Hood Suppression System – Semi Annual, Annual

•

Fire and Smoke Door Assemblies – Annual

•

Fire Hydrants – Annual

•

Fire Dampers – 4-years

•

Elevator – Annual

•

Boiler – Annual

•

Electrical Outlets – Annual

•

Oxygen and Vacuum Systems – Annual

•

Exit Signs / Emergency Lighting (inside) - Annual

All daily, weekly and monthly- Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance will be done inhouse by the
Physical Plant Team and as required by the NFPA 101 or the appropriate referenced NFPA
standard, with reports prepared and delivered to the Physical Plant Director for filing as
inspection, testing, and maintenance is completed.
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Corridors / Means of Egress
Proper maintenance and free of obstructions shall be provided in all corridors and Means of
Egress at all times to ensure the dependability of the exits for evacuation in the event of a fire or
other emergency.

PROHIBITED
Smoking; candles / incense sticks unless battery or a plug in type; any open flame; space
heaters of any kind; extension cords, plug adapters; grease fryers; toasters; coffee machines.

Holiday Decorations

The following policy establishes requirements of using holiday decorations. Consult the Physical
Plant Director with all decorating plans for final approval.
1.

Furnishings/Decorations
a.

Furnishings/Decorations shall not be placed in any area that will obscure an exit

or interfere with egress from an area (including stairwells).

b.

Furnishings/Decoration shall not be suspended from the ceiling, sprinkler head, or

attached to any fire door assembly

c.

Furnishings/Decorations of an explosive or highly flammable character are

prohibited. Decorations must be flame resistant. Combustible decorations are prohibited
in all areas, unless of such limited size or quantity that will not contribute to the
development or spread of fire, such as photographs and paintings.

2. No candles or other open flame furnishings/decorations are allowed.
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3. Surge protectors, extension cords, and other electrical components must be hospital
grade, UL or FM listed, and approved by Physical Plant Director.

4. All decorative lighting must have a UL or FM approved tag attached to the male end of the
decorative lighting. All others are prohibited.

5. Live / real Christmas trees are prohibited.

6. Life Safety Code, Healthcare Facilities Code, Electrical Code and referenced standards shall
be fully complied with and is always the final rule.

Final Inspection
All furnishings/decorations will be inspected by Physical Plant Director for compliance with the
rules and code compliance. Department Managers shall contact Physical Plant Director for
inspection before and after decorating period. Decorations shall not be displayed longer than
two weeks. Any furnishings/decorations not in compliance with all fire and life safety rules are
prohibited and will be permanently removed.

Fire Safety Policy:
This facility is a 2-story addition to the existing 23,180 square feet building now used for office
space, storage, and cooking facilities. The new addition has 78 long term care/skilled nursing
beds and encompasses an additional 54,840 square feet. The two buildings are separated by a
2-hour fire wall.
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This building is classified as an I-2 (Institutional) with a construction type as Type II (111). The
building is of primary steel frame construction resting on concrete footings under a 4-inch poured
concrete floor. The exterior walls include concrete block, metal studs, and treated plywood,
finished with a modular brick veneer.

The roof assembly uses metal trusses and untreated plywood. Both the new and existing
buildings have an automatic sprinkler system with quick response sprinkler heads throughout
including the attic and is monitored offsite by a hardwired interconnected fire alarm system.

All employees shall be periodically instructed in life safety procedures, devices, and be kept
informed of their duties under this plan to respond and implement a Code Red procedure.

A hardcopy of this plan shall be readily available at all times at each nurse’s station throughout
the facility. The charge nurse will always be the initial fire incident commander until relieved of
this duty by the administrator or fire department command.

Fire drills are to test and evaluate the efficiency, knowledge, and response of personnel in
implementing this facility fire safety emergency plan.

Fire drills conducted between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. (2100 hours and 0600 hours), a coded
announcement shall be permitted to be used instead of audible alarms.

Fire drills shall include the transmission of a fire alarm signal and simulation of emergency fire
conditions. When a coded announcement is conducted between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. (2100
hours and 0600 hours), the transmission of a fire alarm signal is to be conducted within the
following two shifts.
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Fire drills will be scheduled on a random basis to ensure that all personnel from each shift are
drilled not less than once in each 3-month period.

Fire Drills shall be conducted quarterly on each shift by all staff to familiarize facility personnel
(resident care and support, facility maintenance, and administrative staff) with the signals and
emergency action required under varied conditions. All staff shall participate in fire safety
orientation and fire and emergency drills at the time of such event.

Fire Drills shall consider the ability to move patients to an adjacent smoke compartment.
Relocation can be practiced using simulated patients or empty wheelchairs. Infirm or bedridden
patients shall not be required to be moved during drills to safe areas or to the exterior of the
building. Residents who are capable of assisting in their own evacuation shall be instructed in
evacuation routes and techniques and may participate in drill exercises.

Contractors within the facility at the time of an event shall promptly report to their closest nurse’s
station for further instructions.

The results of fire drills shall be documented and used to educate staff on fire safety procedures.

Emphasis should be placed on the quick movement of residents who are in the room of fire
origin, then others who are directly exposed to the fire leading to full evacuation of the smoke
compartment. Resident relocation in fire emergencies is often achieved by dragging occupants
on bedding, as opposed to moving beds.

NEXT PAGE →
Copyright © 2021 by Edward Hale, All Rights Reserved.

Page 162 of 263

When moving residents, non-ambulatory residents shall be lowered to a blanket on the floor and
pulled to the area of refuge, “Blanket Drag”. If further evacuation is necessary, residents will
need to be carried.

Ambulatory residents shall be instructed to crouch below the smoke level and be assisted to
safety.

Residents needing or using oxygen shall be provided with portable tanks. Additional tanks are
available in the Med Gas storage area.

Know your Fire Plan and location of all extinguishers and fire alarm pull stations so that in case
of emergency you can act quickly. Fire extinguishers are easily accessible and located in
cabinets throughout the corridors and in certain higher hazard area (i.e. Laundry, kitchen,
mechanical rooms, etc.).

This facility utilizes ABC multi-purpose type fire extinguishers that can be used for a variety of
fire situations.

Fire Alarm System. Know the location of automatic detectors and how to tell if they have been
set off. A fire may originate in a storeroom or other remote area, which may set off a smoke or
heat detector. If the alarm sounds and no one has informed you of the location or of their
awareness of a fire, you should immediately check the annunciator panels located at each floor
Nursing Station for the location of the fire. Search this area and when the fire or smoke is
located, immediately implement the Immediate Fire Procedure.
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Know evacuation procedures and methods of moving patients with limited help. The escape
route will, of course, depend on the location of the actual fire.

Consideration must be given to those patients and residents who are impaired with loss of
hearing, vision, or other sensory functions to insure they receive notification, assistance, and
immediate attention when in endangered areas.

This facility does not have basement areas. If the fire is localized or segregated from other parts
of the building it is not necessary to move patients outside of the building, but rather out of the
smoke compartment to areas of refuge within the facility, which are protected by fire walls, fire
doors, and smoke barriers. If it appears the fire may be out of control, the decision for complete
evacuation shall be made by the event incident commander, in most cases, this will be the fire
department.

The fire alarm system is connected to an "automatic dialer" or digital communicator, which is
located just outside the boiler room. This dialer automatically dials a UL Listed Monitoring
Company and gives them a recorded message whenever the fire alarm is activated. This is an
additional safety precaution taken to insure a quick response by our local fire department.
However, when you discover a fire, the person or station discovering the fire should also call
“911” as an added precaution in case the automatic equipment should fail.
The main air handling units located in mechanical rooms and on the roof are also inter-connected
to the fire alarm system. Thus, when the fire alarm is activated all main air handling units within
the fire zone are automatically shut down to prevent the spread of smoke through the air handling
system.
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The period of least staff coverage occurs during the 11-7 shift. Staff members are to remain
awake at all times while on facility property.

Escape routes shall be free from obstructions at all times. All corridors and fire extinguisher
cabinets are to be kept free from obstructions at all times (IE. Carts, resident lifts, chairs, etc.)

The Physical Plant Director shall maintain files on all fire ratings for furnishings, products,
carpets, etc.

All employees shall be trained in appropriate staff response to a fire emergency.

All new employees shall receive the Fire Safety Orientation which encompasses:

A.

Employee responsibilities

B.

Fire prevention

C.

The fire detection and extinguishing system

D.

Fire plan protocols including TRACE
(Tell Someone, Rescue, Alarm, Confine, Evacuate/Extinguish)

Departmental supervisors shall orient new employees to the fire detection and extinguishing
systems located in their departments.

All employees will be in-serviced semi-annually on the fire management plan and are expected
to know it, a graded exam will be kept in each employee’s file.
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Fire Drill Procedure

•

Before conducting a live drill the monitoring company shall be notified by Physical Plant
Director to prevent the dispatching of the Fire Department. They shall be notified when drill
is complete to confirm the alarm signal was received. The date and time alarm signal was
received shall be recorded on the report

•

Fire drills shall include the transmission of a fire alarm signal and simulation of emergency
fire conditions. When a coded announcement is conducted between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
(2100 hours and 0600 hours), the transmission of a fire alarm signal is to be conducted within
the following two shifts.

•

At least one drill will be held each month. Drills will be rotated on each shift at the discretion
of the Physical Plant Director so that each work shift has one drill each quarter.

•

The Physical Plant Director will lead the drill and will assign observers to assist in carrying
out the drill and documenting the events of the drill.

•

The Fire Drill Report will be carefully completed for each drill and all personnel shall be
critiqued on their reaction to the drill and their proper adherence to the fire plan by the
Physical Plant Director.

•

The written report shall include the date, shift, 10-items of fire safety plan and if all items were
met, names of participants, types of instruction, observations of resident response and a
general critique to improve performance.
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•

Drill situations, locations and times shall be sufficiently varied to benefit all departments and
personnel. Drill locations shall be rotated from department/general location to
department/location so that all areas of the facility participate.

•

Departmental in-service meetings shall include discussion and instruction on these drills and
personnel lacking an understanding of the fire plan as demonstrated by the drills shall be
properly counseled and re-evaluated.

•

Drill situations shall be realistic and personnel shall be required to move patients if in danger
area, know location of fire alarm manual pull stations and how to activate the fire alarm, know
locations of fire extinguishers and practice getting them during drills.

•

Fire drill deficiencies will be used to develop in-services for departments.

Building Evacuation

In all cases of fire or smoke, the affected smoke compartment will be evacuated. If the fire area
is on the 1st-floor, the smoke compartment above the fire shall also be evacuated to an area of
safe refuge. In most cases, a full building evacuation will not be necessary or advisable. If it is
determined, however, that the facility may not be suitable for occupancy, a total building
evacuation may be warranted. The order to evacuate the building will be given by the Fire or
Emergency Incident Commander.
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Procedure
Decision to Evacuate - Factors upon which the decision to evacuate include, but are not limited
to the following:

A.

Structural Integrity of the Building (following an episode such as an explosion,

severe weather breach, etc…).

B.

Emergency/Life Threatening Conditions i.e., fires, chemical releases

Building Occupant Procedure
At any time there is a CODE RED, the immediate area followed by the smoke compartment shall
be vacated until all clear is determined. Do not fully evacuate the building unless have been
instructed to do so by Fire Incident Commander or danger is imminent (i.e. explosion, fire).

A.

The Fire Department or Administration will identify a safe area of refuge. The

charge nurse/department supervisor will assign patient priority, and, in consultation with
Administration or the Fire Department, provide directions to the safe area of refuge and/or
which stairway to use.

B.

Imminent Danger: Evacuate using the nearest EXIT or stairwell. Do not use

elevators unless directed to do so by the Fire Incident Commander.
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AMBULATORY RESIDENTS will be the first to leave. Line residents up in a single file and walk
them hand in hand to the designated area of safe refuge. KEEP NEAR WALL AND USE
HANDRAILS. Personnel will escort residents to the safe area of refuge.

NON-AMBULATORY RESIDENTS will be evacuated per instructions of the Incident
Commander and Administration. Personnel assigned to the residents will remain with them until
“all clear” and responsibility has been reassigned.

DISABLED EMPLOYEES AND VISITORS (Americans with Disabilities Act)
Will be evacuated in the same manner as patients who require assistance in
transporting/evacuating.

HORIZONTAL EVACUATION
A.

Move patients who are closest to the danger first.

B.

Move ambulatory patients toward the nearest and safest protected area. Personnel will

be assigned to the patients and will remain with them.

C.

Move wheelchair patients to a safe area on the same floor. Return chairs for additional

patients.

D.

Move non-ambulatory patients via stretchers. If stretchers are unavailable, use the cradle

drop method to place a resident on a blanket, which has been set on the floor. Then, pull the
resident out along the floor to a safe location.
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VERTICAL EVACUATION
A.

Lead ambulatory persons up or down the nearest and safest protected exits/stairways.

Administration and/or Incident Commander will identify the area of safe refuge.

B.

Non-ambulatory persons should be moved up or down stairways by means of the two-

man swing carry or the three-man and four-man blanket carries.

***END***
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APPENDIX D - Fire Safety Evaluation System
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APPENDIX E - ASTM E 2280 -13
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